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SEEING TORTURE ANEW:
A TRANSNATIONAL 
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF STATE 
TORTURE AND VISUAL EVIDENCE
HEDI VITERBO*
This Article puts forward two interdependent conceptual reforms at the 
intersection of state torture, visuality, and law.  First, to qualify as good 
evidencelegally and sociallytorture images are usually required to be 
“accurate” and “transparent,” to successfully suppress all traces of the 
mediation and representation at work.  However, this Article suggests that 
this prevalent visual-evidentiary paradigm unwittingly serves state attempts to 
downplay, decontextualize, deny, and disregard torture allegations.  In this 
light, drawing on the interdisciplinary field of visual studies, this Article re-
envisages the limitations as well as the critical potential of torture images.
Second, international and domestic law tend to conceptualize state 
torture in exclusively physical and mental terms.  Challenging this tendency, 
this Article argues that the extreme gravity of the physical and mental 
violence of torture ought not obscure, and in fact warrants closer attention to 
two other, interrelated forms of violence through which state torture operates, 
acquires its meaning, is experienced, and is made possible: (a) the violence of 
state mechanisms of (in)visibilityrepresentational violencewhich includes 
state efforts to control by whom and to what degree state torture can be seen; 
and (b) the violence of lawlegal violencewhich manifests itself in the 
contribution of legal institutions, lawyers, and legal rhetoric to enabling, 
legitimating, and keeping state torture out of public sight.
The perspective of this Article is transnational, focusing on three cases of 
state torture: detainees in U.S. custody overseas; Palestinian detainees in 
Israeli custody; and opposition group members detained in Syria.  Legal 
examples and visual materials from these three cases provide a contextualized 
basis for exploring what new light the proposed conceptual reforms can shed 
on the socio-political complexities and consequences of state torture.
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INTRODUCTION
A. The Dominant Visual-Evidentiary Regime and Its Pitfalls: Lessons from 
Abu Ghraib
The evidentiary status of visual images has been described as a matter of 
legal and social ambivalence.  On the one hand, a common belief is that “a picture 
is worth a thousand words,” that visual images are the closest available substitute 
for seeing the “real” thing.  On the other hand, countervailing concerns abound 
about the potential deceptiveness and manipulability of visual materials.1 These 
concerns are especially heightened when it comes to law (where reliability is 
paramount)2 and torture (which, like other traumatic experiences, is often 
considered unrepresentable).3
1  RICHARD K. SHERWIN, VISUALIZING LAW IN THE AGE OF THE DIGITAL BAROQUE:
ARABESQUES & ENTANGLEMENTS 5, 31–32, 36–37 (2011); Christopher J. Buccafusco, Gaining/Losing 
Perspective on the Law, or Keeping Visual Evidence in Perspective, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 609, 616–22
(2004); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy,
10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1–3, 14–43 (1998); see also Louise Amoore, Vigilant Visualities: The 
Watchful Politics of the War on Terror, 38 SECURITY DIALOGUE 215, 217–18 (2007) (arguing that 
visuality is commonly regarded as the “sovereign” and most reliable of the senses).  Though the Syrian 
case will be examined later in this Article, it is worth noting here the particularly strong misgivings 
surrounding photographs and videos that have recently emerged from Syria.  Apart from the anonymity 
of the sources of these images, the Syrian government and the oppositionwhich produce many of 
these imageshave been suspected of intentionally disseminating disinformation.  See DAVID W.
LESCH, SYRIA: THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ASSAD 94, 97, 120–21 (2012).
2  JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN IS LIFE GRIEVABLE? 81 (2009); ELAINE SCARRY,
THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 10 (1985); Shoshana Felman, In an 
Era of Testimony: Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah, 79 YALE FRENCH STUD. 39, 39 (1991).
3  SCARRY, supra note 2, at 4, 6–7, 13, 54, 56; SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE JURIDICAL 
UNCONSCIOUS: TRIALS AND TRAUMAS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 83 (2002); see also RUTH LEYS,
TRAUMA: A GENEALOGY 6–9 (2000) (characterizing trauma theory as “simultaneously attracted to and 
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There is little if any ambivalence, however, as to how images are to be 
judged, for better or worse.  Normally, visual images are labeled as “good 
evidence” if they successfully suppress all traces of the mediation (and 
representation) at work and, accordingly, appear to be “accurate,” “transparent,” 
and “neutral.”4 In the spirit of naïve realism,5 photographs or videos of torture are 
thus assumed to possess the power of “capturing” torture incidents and, in so doing, 
providing their viewers with access to “the truth,” to what “really” happened.  
Given this belief in the self-evidence of the visual truth of state torture, no need 
arises to seelet alone render visible and scrutinizethe mechanisms and forces 
involved in the production of such visual images.6
This prevalent visual-evidentiary paradigm has some acute failings, among 
which is its blindness to what, in naïve realism, is not patently visible in 
photographs or videos of state torturesuch as the broader social, legal, and 
political context that gave rise to the incidents these images “capture.”  A testament 
to this peril, and also a well-known exception to the paucity of photographic or 
video evidence of state torture, are the photographs and videos showing detainees 
abused and tortured in U.S. custody at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.  When they 
became public in 2004, the Abu Ghraib pictures rapidly spread across the globe, 
attracting widespread attention, inciting public outrage and a demand that those 
responsible be held accountable for their actions.  Ultimately, there were some 
official inquiries, which resulted, in a few cases, in reprimands, disciplinary action, 
and, for enlisted soldiers, courts-martial.7
Yet, aside from being a mere fraction of all the pictures documenting abuse 
and torture at Abu Ghraib,8
repelled by the mimetic-suggestive” understanding of trauma as represented by words and images).
the photographs that were published in 2004 also 
4  JOHN TAGG, A Means of Surveillance: The Photograph as Evidence in Law, in THE BURDEN OF 
REPRESENTATION: ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHIES AND HISTORIES 66, 95–98 (1988); Buccafusco, supra
note 1, at 629–30.  However, the invisibility of the mechanisms of mediation and representation is 
likely to be denounced when it jeopardizes, rather than enhances, the desired neutrality of an image.  
For example, the Associated Press recently announced it was severing its ties with a Pulitzer Prize-
winning photographer who had altered a digital photograph of the conflict in Syria by removing a 
colleague’s video camera from the frame.  See Heather Saul, Pulitzer Prize-Winning Photographer 
Narciso Contreras Sacked for Altering Syria Picture, INDEP. (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/pulitzer-prizewinning-photographer-narciso-contreras-
sacked-for-altering-syria-picture-9079504.html.
5  “Naïve realism” can be generally associated with, among other things, the notion that 
photographs are privileged visual information free from representational constraints.  See, e.g.,
JENNIFER GREEN-LEWIS, FRAMING THE VICTORIANS: PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE CULTURE OF REALISM 
23 (1996).
6  SHERWIN, supra note 1, at 39; TAGG, supra note 4, at 99–100; Andrew E. Taslitz, What 
Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 171, 173–74 (1999).
7  SUSIE LINFIELD, THE CRUEL RADIANCE: PHOTOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 151–62
(2012); Derek Gregory, Vanishing Points: Law, Violence, and Exception in the Global War Prison, in
TERROR AND THE POSTCOLONIAL 55, 58, 61, 79–81 (Elleke Boehmer & Stephen Morton eds., 2010);
Nicholas Mirzoeff, Invisible Empire: Visual Culture, Embodied Spectacle, and Abu Ghraib, 95 
RADICAL HIST. REV. 21 (2006).  On artistic reactions to these images, see, for example, W. J. T.
MITCHELL, CLONING TERROR: THE WAR OF IMAGES, 9/11 TO THE PRESENT 4–5, 99–111, 137–59
(2011); Eliana Herrera-Vega, The Politics of Torture in Antagonistic Politics, and its Displacement by 
the Regime of the Arts: Abu Ghraib, Colombian Paramilitaries and Fernando Botero, 59 CURRENT 
SOC. 675 (2011); Philip Metres, Remaking/Unmaking: Abu Ghraib and Poetry, 123.5 PMLA 1596 
(2008); Abigail Solomono-Godeau, Torture and Representation: The Art of Détournement, in
SPEAKING ABOUT TORTURE 115, 126 (Julie A. Carlson & Elisabeth Weber eds., 2012).
8  Most of the 144 photographs submitted to U.S. army investigators were shown only to members 
of Congress despite a suit by the ACLU.  Mirzoeff, supra note 7. Only in 2006 and again in 2009 were 
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decontextualized that torture, isolating it from its institutional setting.  In Derek 
Gregory’s words, these pictures rendered Abu Ghraib a space of both “constructed 
and constricted visibility”:
What happened at Abu Ghraib was glossed as unacceptable but un-
American, appalling but an aberration, inexcusable but an exception. . . .
[T]he photographs eventually came to stand in the way of an adequate 
understanding of what happened.  The public gaze was directed toward the 
images, not the process and policy behind them.  Critical attention was 
focused on acts isolated as a series of stills and frames rather than on the 
apparatus that produced them.9
By detaching individual incidents from their broader context, pictures like 
these might thus end up implicated in keeping the systematic nature of state torture 
invisible.  Responsibility in such cases might consequently be placed, if at all, on 
low-level state agents while senior figures remain unaccountable.  Indeed, such has 
been the case with the Abu Ghraib incidents10 and also in Israel.11
Apart from sustaining impunity for state torture, the sort of visual materials 
that are likely to be considered good evidence are also susceptible to incorporation 
into state denial of torture allegations.12 If certain visual materials, such as 
photographs, videos or visible physical injuries,13
many additional photographs and videos published by the media.  See Matthew Moore, The Photos 
America Doesn’t Want Seen, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 15, 2006), 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/the-photos-america-doesnt-want-
seen/2006/02/14/1139890737099.html; Concern at ‘Prisoner Abuse’ Photographs as Barack Obama 
Prepares to Block Publication, TELEGRAPH (May 15, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/barackobama/5325444/Prisoner-abuse-photographs-surface-as-Barack-Obama-
prepares-to-block-publication.html; Introduction: The Abu Ghraib Files, SALON (Mar. 14, 2006), 
http://www.salon.com/2006/03/14/introduction_2.
enjoy a privileged evidentiary 
9  Gregory, supra note 7, at 58, 61; see also Jared Del Rosso, The Textual Mediation of Denial:
Congress, Abu Ghraib, and the Construction of an Isolated Incident, 58 SOC. PROBS. 165 (2011); Jasbir 
K. Puar, Abu Ghraib: Arguing Against Exceptionalism, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 522, 522–24, 531 (2004); 
Mark Danner, Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 7, 2004), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/oct/07/abu-ghraib-the-hidden-story.
10  On unaccountability for torture at Abu Ghraib, see generally ALFRED W. MCCOY, 
Psychological Torture and Public Forgetting, in TORTURE AND IMPUNITY: THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF 
COERCIVE INTERROGATION (2012); Nathan Gorelick, Imagining Extraordinary Renditions: Terror, 
Torture and the Possibility of Excessive Ethics in Literature, 11 THEORY & EVENT (2008); Danner, 
supra note 9; Mirzoeff, supra note 7; Philip Gourevitch, The Abu Ghraib We Cannot See, N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2009),  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/opinion/24gourevitch.html.
11  On Israeli unaccountability for torture of Palestinians, see generally PUB. COMM. AGAINST 
TORTURE IN ISR., ACCOUNTABILITY DENIED: THE ABSENCE OF INVESTIGATION AND PUNISHMENT OF 
TORTURE IN ISRAEL (2009), available at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/Accountability_Denied
_Eng.pdf.
12  See STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 
168–95 (2001) (arguing that images of human rights violations might work to further denial strategies 
among state and non-state actors).
13  On Palestinians’ and NGOs’ “use” of visible bodily traces of abuse by the Israeli authorities to 
demonstrate suffering to these authorities and international observers, see Lori A. Allen, Martyr Bodies 
in the Media: Human Rights, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Immediation in the Palestinian Intifada, 36 
AM. ETHNOLOGIST 161, 163, 167–68, 170–71 (2009).  On Israeli law’s use of Palestinian child 
defendants’ physical appearance as a source of evidence, see Hedi Viterbo, The Age of Conflict: 
Rethinking Childhood, Law, and Age Through the Israeli-Palestinian Case, in LAW AND CHILDHOOD 
STUDIES—CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES VOL. 14, at 133, 144–47 (Michael Freeman ed., 2012).
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status,14 then their absence might facilitate the dismissalin the form of either 
disregard or denialof (verbal) torture testimonies.15 This problem too was 
evidenced by the 2004 Abu Ghraib pictures, or more specifically by the scant public 
attention given to NGO warnings and Iraqi testimonies about abuse at Abu Ghraib
prior to the release of these pictures.16
Thus, the Abu Ghraib case demonstrates the troubling, if unwitting, 
contribution of torture images to the downplaying, disregard, or denial of important 
aspects or evidence of that torture.  Viewed in this light, supposedly good visual 
evidence of this sort not only counters torture, but also, in more ways than one, 
plays into the hands of state attempts to control its (in)visibility.  Therefore, beyond 
asking what elements of state torture are prevented from being publicly visible, an 
equally important question is what and how visibility itself conceals, how seeing 
more can mean seeing less.17 Calls for more photographic and video evidence of 
state torture, as important as they may be, will not do18
B. The Conceptualization of Torture in Physical and Mental Terms
at least not without also 
bringing into question the dominant representational regime of state torture.
Alongside the dominant evidentiary-visual regime discussed so far, another 
conventional view needs rethinking: the clear tendency, in both international and 
14  KATHERINE BIBER, CAPTIVE IMAGES: RACE, CRIME, PHOTOGRAPHY 5 (2007); SUSAN 
SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 5 (1979); Didier Fassin, The Humanitarian Politics of Testimony: 
Subjectification Through Trauma in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 23 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
531, 553 (2008).
15  Cf. LINFIELD, supra note 7, at 160 (“The Abu Ghraib images . . . have strengthened . . . the 
status of photographs as documents of the real. No written account of the tortures could have made 
such an impact.”); MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 117 (“Verbal reports [of abuse at Abu Ghraib], no matter 
how detailed or credible, would never have had the impact of . . . [the Abu Ghraib] photographs.”);
EYAL WEIZMAN, THE LEAST OF ALL POSSIBLE EVILS: HUMANITARIAN VIOLENCE FROM ARENDT TO 
GAZA 103–08 (2011) (describing a social “shift of emphasis from human testimony towards objects of 
material evidence”).
16  Gregory, supra note 7, at 79–81; Charles J. Hanley, Early Accounts of Extensive Iraq Abuse 
Met U.S. Silence, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (May 9, 2004), http://www.semissourian.com/story/
137193.html; Mirzoeff, supra note 7, at 24.
17  See LAURA KURGAN, CLOSE UP AT A DISTANCE: MAPPING, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS 16–
17 (2013) (arguing that imaging technologies “let us see too much, and hence blind us to what we 
cannot see, imposing a quiet tyranny of orientation that erases the possibility of disoriented discovery”).  
Furthermore, photographs and videos like those depicting torture at Abu Ghraib risk reiterating either 
the sensationalism or the spectacle-like aspect of torture.  See, e.g., Solomono-Godeau, supra note 7, at 
126 (arguing that refraining from using figurative imagery of torture avoids this risk).  But see
LINFIELD, supra note 7 (arguing that photographs depicting political violence can illuminate the 
modern history of violence and the human capacity for cruelty).
18  Some have gone even further by questioning how much of an impact such visual evidence 
actually has.  See STEPHEN F. EISENMAN, THE ABU GHRAIB EFFECT (2010) (arguing that U.S. citizens 
mostly discounted the Abu Ghraib photographs due to these photographs’ depiction of the torture 
victims as taking pleasure in their own extreme pain).  A more recent example is the 55,000 photos of 
corpses of executed (and in some cases apparently tortured) Syrians.  Taken by a Syrian police 
photographer, authenticated by forensic experts, and examined by British lawyers, these photosto 
which David Luban referred when talking about “what could be the best-documented crimes against 
humanity in two decades”nonetheless failed to attract substantial attention from either the Obama 
administration or the U.S. press. See David Luban, Syrian Torture: What the U.S. Must Do, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/feb/03/syrian-torture-what-us-
must-do.
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domestic law, to conceptualize state torture as exclusively physical and mental.19
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.
The U.N. Convention Against Torture epitomizes this tendency when defining 
torture, for its purposes, as:
20
While such legal definitions have rightly been criticized for failing to 
delineate what torture is and how it operates,21
Yet, the violence through which state torture operates, is experienced, and 
is made possible is not solely physical and mental.
the prevailing understanding of 
torture as exclusively physical and mental has remained largely unchallenged.
22
19  For a survey of the definition(s) of torture in international and domestic law, see David 
Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 L.
& INEQ. 343 (2011).  On the history and language of prohibitions on torture in international law, see
Nigel S. Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, 55 C.L.P. 467 (2002).
There are also the violence of 
state mechanisms of (in)visibilityrepresentational violencewhich includes state 
attempts to control the (in)visibility of torture; and the violence of legal rhetoric, 
institutions and professionalslegal violencewhich consists of law’s complicity 
in legitimating, bringing about, and concealing state torture.  As will gradually 
become apparent, the dominant visual-evidentiary paradigm, whose pitfalls were 
20  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
art. 1(1), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
21  John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV.
237, 246–49 (2003).  For the counter-argument that the legal definition of “torture” should not be 
broadened, see, for example, Sanford Levinson, In Quest of a “Common Conscience”: Reflections on 
the Current Debate About Torture, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 231, 238, 242 (2005); Marcy Strauss, 
Torture, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 201, 215 (2004).
22  The longstanding scholarly debate over the meaning of violence exceeds the scope of this 
Article.  Suffice it to note that while some have advocated circumscribing this concept to interpersonal 
physical or psychological harm, others have extended it beyond these boundaries.  For the former 
position, see C. A. J. Coady, The Idea of Violence, 3 J. APPLIED PHIL. 3 (1986); RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
Violence, in KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 329, 331 (2d ed. 1983).  For the 
latter, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER (1991); Johan Galtung, Cultural 
Violence, 27 J. PEACE RES. 291 (1990); Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J.
PEACE RES. 167 (1969); see also Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A 
Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607 (1997) 
(formulating a jurisprudential version of the latter position: a gender-sensitive reconceptualization of 
violence as including male dominance and the subordination, marginalization, and subjugation of 
women).  For further discussion of this debate, see Vittorio Bufacchi, Two Concepts of Violence, 3 POL.
STUD. REV. 193 (2005); Willem de Haan, Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept, in VIOLENCE 
IN EUROPE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 27 (Sophie Body-Gendrot & Pieter 
Spierenburg eds., 2008).  The similarity between this debate and that mentioned supra note 21
regarding how broadly to define “torture” is unsurprising given the strong (albeit often under-theorized) 
connection between torture and violence.  It is worth noting that when considering the nature, effects, 
or legitimacy of violence in the context of this Article, one must bear in mind the specificity of the 
violence in question, namely state violence.
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discussed above, is part and parcel of this representational and legal violence of 
state torture.
C. The Three Test Cases: The United States, Israel/Palestine, and Syria
Before examining some central manifestations of the representational and 
legal violence of torture in the U.S., Israeli-Palestinian, and Syrian cases, a brief 
overview of each of these is in order.  The United States has been criticized for 
torturing and abusing detainees overseas as part of its post-9/11 “war on terror” in 
Afghanistan, at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility, in Iraqincluding the Abu 
Ghraib case discussed aboveand elsewhere.23 Since the Guantánamo facility was 
opened in 2002, the Department of Defense has held nearly 800 detainees there; at 
the time of writing, more than four years after President Obama’s deadline to close 
it, 155 detainees remain, of whom only a handful have been charged with any 
offense.24
In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel has subjected Palestinians to 
its military law and tries them in its military courts.25 Allegations of the abuse and 
torture of Palestinians in Israeli custody are rife, a decade after a Supreme Court 
ruling (discussed below) prohibited the routine use of “physical pressure” in 
interrogations.  There have also been hundreds of accusations that Palestinian 
security services torture Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.26
Syria has a long history of torture,27 but the ongoing armed conflict28
23  On the use of torture by the United States in this context, see generally ACLU, ENDURING 
ABUSE: TORTURE AND CRUEL TREATMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AT HOME AND ABROAD (2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/safefree/torture/torture_report.pdf; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN “HIGH VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA CUSTODY
(2007), available at www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf; REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S
TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT (2013), available at http://detaineetaskforce.org/read 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION PROJECT].
between the government and opposition has intensified global concerns about this 
issue.  By April 2014, more than 150,000 Syrians, mostly civilians, were thought to 
have died, tens of thousands of others to have been arrested, and over two million
24  Guantánamo by the Numbers, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/guantanamo-
numbers (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
25  On these military courts, see generally LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI 
MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (2005); Kathleen Cavanaugh, The Israeli 
Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 197 (2007); Sharon Weill, 
The Judicial Arm of the Occupation: The Israeli Military Courts in the Occupied Territories, 89 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 395 (2007).
26  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ABUSIVE SYSTEM: FAILURES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN GAZA 18–20
(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt1012ForUpload_0.pdf; see also
ADDAMEER, STOLEN HOPE: POLITICAL DETENTION IN THE WEST BANK 24–41 (2011), available at
http://addameer.org/userfiles/EN%20PA%20Violations%20Report%202009-2010.pdf (examining 
individual cases of torture and other forms of cruel and inhumane treatment by Palestinian security 
services).
27  Sune Haugbolle, Imprisonment, Truth Telling and Historical Memory in Syria, 13 
MEDITERRANEAN POL. 261, 265–68 (2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SYRIA UNMASKED: THE 
SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE ASSAD REGIME 54–77, 149–51 (1991).
28  On the question of how to legally classify the current situation in Syria, see Laurie R. Blank & 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict 
Recognition, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 693 (2013).
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people to have fled the country during this conflict.29 According to testimonies of 
former detainees, as well as those of defectors from the Syrian military and 
intelligence forces, torture is commonly used in detention centers across the 
country, and in many cases has resulted in death.30 Furthermore, some armed 
opposition groups in Syria have also been accused of capturing and torturing 
security force members, government supporters, and people identified as members 
of pro-government militias.31
There are obviously important differences between the United States, 
Israel/Palestine, and Syria, including those relating to torture.  One is the level of 
visibility of state torture, and state violence generally, in each of these countries.  
Among the reasons for this particular disparity is that, according to NGO reports, 
media freedom is greater in the United States than in Israel32 and is considerably 
greater in both these countries than in Syria.33 In fact, Syria has been denounced as 
one of the world’s most dangerous countries for the media.34
Such differences notwithstanding, as will be illustrated, the United States, 
Israel/Palestine, and Syria share comparable, if not common, features of torture.  
Moreover, in some circumstances, the very practice of torture transcends national 
borders.  Thus, after 9/11, in addition to holding thousands of detainees overseas, 
the U.S. administration made increased use of so-called “extraordinary 
29  AMNESTY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT: SYRIA 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-syria-2013; Syria Death Toll Over 150,000, 
Says Human Rights Body, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-
syria-crisis-toll-idUSBREA300YX20140401.
30  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TORTURE ARCHIPELAGO: ARBITRARY ARRESTS, TORTURE AND 
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN SYRIA’S UNDERGROUND PRISONS SINCE MARCH 2011, at 17–31
(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0712webwcover.pdf; Syria: 
Visit Reveals Torture Chambers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 17, 2013), http://hrw.org/news/2013/
05/16/syria-visit-reveals-torture-chambers.
31  Syria: Summary Killings and Other Abuses by Armed Opposition Groups, AMNESTY INT’L 
(Mar. 14, 2013), http://www2.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/briefing_opposition_force_abuses.pdf; 
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29; Syria: Armed Opposition Groups Committing Abuses, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/20/syria-armed-opposition-groups-
committing-abuses; Patrick Witty, Witness to a Syrian Execution: “I Saw a Scene of Utter Cruelty”,
TIME (Sept. 12, 2013), http://lightbox.time.com/2013/09/12/witness-to-a-syrian-execution-i-saw-a-
scene-of-utter-cruelty.
32  Israeli journalists have generally been barred from the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 
recent years, and during the military offensive in the Gaza Strip from December 2008 to January 2009 
Israeli authorities also banned foreign journalists from this territory.  Furthermore, the Israeli military 
has been accused of numerous abuses against media workers in the occupied territories.  REPORTERS 
WITHOUT BORDERS, ANNUAL REPORT 2012—ISRAEL (2012), available at http://en.rsf.org/report-
israel,154.html.
33  10 Most Censored Countries, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (May 2, 2012), 
http://cpj.org/reports/2012/05/10-most-censored-countries.php; FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS 2013 (2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-
2013; Press Freedom Index 2014, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://rsf.org/index2014/en-
index2014.php (last visited May 20, 2014).
34  IFJ Renews Call to UN and Governments to Halt Slaughter of Journalists After 121 Killings in 
Bloody 2012, INT’L FED’N OF JOURNALISTS (Dec. 31, 2012), http://africa.ifj.org/en/articles/ifj-renews-
call-to-un-and-governments-to-halt-slaughter-of-journalists-after-121-killings-in-bloody-2012; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FALSE FREEDOM: ONLINE CENSORSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA 66–90 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mena1105
webwcover.pdf; LESCH, supra note 1, at 92, 94, 118–21.  Syria acquired some of its most sophisticated 
media surveillance systems from foreign software companies in the United States and elsewhere.  See 
LESCH, supra note 1, at 118–19.  This is a testament to the transnational character of state violence, 
which will be discussed shortly and throughout the rest of the Article.
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renditions”—forcible and extrajudicial transfers of individuals for interrogation to 
countries with especially poor human rights records, including Syria.35 A relatively 
well-known example is the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian-Syrian citizen whose 
rendition to Syria by the United States resulted in his torture in Syrian custody.36 In 
spite of their central role in cases such as Maher Arar’s, the U.S. and Syrian 
governments alike have refused to participate in Canadian inquiries into the torture 
of Canadians abroad.37
There have also been cross-national links, material and symbolic, between 
the interrogation tactics of these different countries.  According to written testimony 
and photographs, detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq were held in a high-stress 
position known as a “Palestinian hanging”;38 though there is no evidence that this 
technique actually originated from Israel/Palestine, the use of this phrase outside 
Israel/Palestine attests, at the very least, to the transnational nature of 
counterterrorism discourses.39 More broadly—beyond the context of torture—the 
United States and Israel have drawn on each other’s counterterrorism doctrines and 
policies extensively since 9/11.40
Alongside these cross-national ties, continuities, and similarities, another 
reason for framing this Article around the U.S., Israeli-Palestinian, and Syrian cases
is the specific torture images examined in this Article.  As suggested below, these 
35  According to a recent report, Syria is among at least fifty-four foreign countries that 
participated in extraordinary rendition or secret detention with the United States.  OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, GLOBALIZING TORTURE: CIA SECRET DETENTION AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 61–
118 (2013), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-
201202 05.pdf.  For further information, see The Global Rendition System, THE RENDITION PROJECT,
http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/global-rendition/index.html (last visited May 20, 2014) 
(mapping CIA rendition flights around the world).  There have been no public allegations of torture as a 
result of extraordinary renditions during the Obama administration.  CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra
note 23, at 321.  However, the exact nature of extraordinary renditions under President Obama is 
unclear: First, the administration has not declared an end to this practice.  OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, supra, at 20.  Second, in 2009, an unnamed official reportedly said that extraordinary 
renditions were still being used.  KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-
TERRORISM 225–26 (2011).
36  Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 52–63
(2009); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1436–42
(2008); Greg Laux, Casenote: Arar with a Twist: Should a Bivens Remedy be Extended to a U.S. 
Citizen Subjected to Extraordinary Rendition? An Evaluation of Whether the Extension of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies Should be Based on Immigration Status, 31 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV.
1071, 1072–75, 1084–90 (2010); Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case 
of Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG. 479, 482–86 (2008); Michael V. Sage, Note: The Exploitation of Legal 
Loopholes in the Name of National Security: A Case Study on Extraordinary Rendition, 37 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 121, 121, 126–27 (2006); Mario Silva, Extraordinary Rendition: A Challenge to Canadian 
and United States Legal Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
313, 336–43 (2009).
37  ROACH, supra note 35, at 11–12.
38  Gregory, supra note 7, at 87.
39  Contrary to Derek Gregory’s claim that this technique “is known as a ‘Palestinian hanging’ 
from its use by the Israeli secret service in the occupied territories,” Gregory, supra note 7, at 87, 
Darius Rejali has argued that it is not actually an Israeli practice, and that the adjective “Palestinian” is 
instead meant to play on the fears Israeli torture evokes, DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY
355–56 (2007).
40  On some similarities and links between Israeli and U.S. counterterrorism doctrines and policies, 
see generally Lisa Hajjar, International Humanitarian Law and “Wars on Terror”: A Comparative 
Analysis of Israeli and American Doctrines and Policies, 36 J. PALESTINE STUD. 21 (2006); Ersun N. 
Kurtulus, The New Counterterrorism: Contemporary Counterterrorism Trends in the United States and 
Israel, 35 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 37 (2012).
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visual materials, which refer to these three particular cases, can serve as a resource 
for critically reimagining and engaging with the issue of state torture.
I. REPRESENTATIONAL VIOLENCE
State torture is embedded in a certain representational economy—a web of 
forces and factors that determine, among other things, by whom and to what extent 
physical and mental torture can be seen before, during, and after its infliction.  
Violence is an ever-lurking effect of representation,41
A somewhat crude spatio-temporal distinction can be drawn between two 
types of representational violence, denoted by the anatomical terms “proximal” and 
“distal.”  Proximal representational violence manifests itself primarily at the 
particular time and place of physical or mental torture, such as the interrogation 
room or the detention facility.  Examples of this type of representational violence 
include state agents’ use of cameras during interrogations or during physical and 
mental torture, and also practices such as blindfolding or hooding that are aimed at 
preventing detainees from seeing or obtaining information about their detention or 
torture.  Distal representational violence, in comparison, extends beyond the 
enclosed space and time within which physical and mental torture operates.  
Examples of this type of representational violence are the secrecy that generally 
surrounds state torture, the destruction of audio-visual evidence of physical and 
mental torture, and the denial of such torture being used.
and in this particular context, 
representational state violence consists of the various practices and mechanisms 
state agents and institutions employ in their attempt to monopolize the 
representational economy of torture.  Put differently, this representational violence 
involves state attempts to control the (in)visibility of torture—to determine what 
can be seen and said, and consequently what can be known in relation to state 
torture, what representations of torture can gain prominence, and what 
representations will be, or will at least seem to be, marginalized or excluded.
A. Proximal Representational Violence
State torture often involves subjecting detainees to representational 
violence, including various practices designed to prevent them from seeing their 
place of detention or identifying state agents.  Two such practices—the blindfolding 
and hooding of detainees—have been widespread in all three cases discussed here: 
the United States,42 Israel/Palestine,43 and Syria.44
41  On the violence of representation, see, for example, Elisabeth Bronfen, Violence of 
Representation—Representation of Violence, 1 LIT 303 (1990); Teresa de Lauretis, The Violence of 
Rhetoric: Considerations on Representation and Gender, in THE VIOLENCE OF REPRESENTATION:
LITERATURE AND THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE 239, 240 (Nancy Armstrong & Leonard Tennenhouse 
eds., 1989); see also FELMAN, supra note 3, at 85 (distinguishing between “a violence that harms or 
that seeks to hurt or kill and a violence that blinds or seeks to prohibit sight”); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK,
VIOLENCE: SIX SIDEWAYS REFLECTIONS 58–72 (2008) (discussing the violence of language); Jacques 
Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 921, 923, 937, 
951, 957, 995 (1990) (discussing the violence of interpretation and of language); Galtung 1990, supra 
note 22, at 299–300 (discussing the violence of language and art).
42  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 2, 10–11, 20, 22, 25–26, 31, 34 (2004), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf; ACLU, supra note 23; INT’L 
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Other practices with similar purposes have also been in use.  There have 
been reports, for instance, of CIA guards in interrogation sites overseas covering 
themselves in black from head to toe and communicating only by hand 
gestures.45 Similarly, in 2000, during his trial for assaulting Palestinian children 
while transferring them to a detention facility, an Israeli Border Police soldier 
admitted to having presented himself to them under a false name.  The soldier 
added that his colleagues had also called him by that name in front of the 
Palestinian detainees, and admitted this had been an accepted practice within his 
military company.46
In some circumstances, while detainees are prevented from seeing certain 
sights and knowing certain details, they are rendered hyper-visible to state 
apparatuses and agents.  The CIA, for example, recorded many of the interrogations 
it conducted at Guantánamo
Although this Article focuses on visual aspects of 
representations and experiences of torture, these two last cases—and also torture 
techniques such as sound assault, isolation, and sleep deprivation—demonstrate that 
representational violence is sometimes auditory or involves other senses as well.
47 and elsewhere overseas48—though the fate of these 
videotapes is a different matter, as explained below—and former detainees in CIA 
interrogation sites have recounted the presence of surveillance cameras in their 
cells.49
Another use of cameras is as a means for torturers to experience, perform, 
visualize, and, in a sense, potentially preserve their violence.50 When thus brought 
into play, the camera can prompt, augment, and orchestrate physical and mental 
torture, and in this respect becomes both a witness to and complicit in it.51 Thus 
photography and videography, whose unwitting contribution to state dismissal of
torture allegations was discussed earlier, can also be part of the violence of 
torture.52
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 
In addition to the Abu Ghraib pictures discussed above, another (far less-
23.
43  CATHERINE COOK, ADAM HANIEH & ADAH KAY (IN ASSOCIATION WITH DEFENCE FOR 
CHILDREN INT’L—PALESTINE), STOLEN YOUTH: THE POLITICS OF ISRAEL’S DETENTION OF 
PALESTINIAN CHILDREN (2004); B’TSELEM & HAMOKED, KEPT IN THE DARK: TREATMENT OF 
PALESTINIAN DETAINEES IN THE PETAH TIKVA INTERROGATION FACILITY OF THE ISRAELI SECURITY 
AGENCY 14–16, 41, 49–51, 59 (2010), available at http://www.btselem.org/download/
201010_kept_in_the_dark_eng.pdf.
44  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30.
45  LALEH KHALILI, TIME IN THE SHADOWS: CONFINEMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES 134–35
(2013).
46  CrimC (Jer) 204/99 State of Israel v. Nakash, ¶¶ 4, 30, 34, 36–37, 42, 47 (Jan. 25, 2000), 
available at http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/k00020499p.htm.
47  Mark Danner, The Twilight of Responsibility: Torture and the Higher Deniability, 49 HOUS. L.
REV. 71, 74 (2012); Mark Denbeaux et al., Captured on Tape: Interrogating and Videotaping of 
Detainees at Guantánamo, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1307, 1308–09 (2011).
48  Douglas Cox, Burn After Viewing: The CIA’s Destruction of the Abu Zubaydah Tapes and the 
Law of Federal Records, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. 131, 134–39 (2011).
49  KHALILI, supra note 45, at 128–35.
50  For critical discussion of the phenomenon of soldiers photographing their abuse of detainees, 
see generally Noel Whitty, Soldier Photography of Detainee Abuse in Iraq: Digital Technology, 
Human Rights and the Death of Baha Mousa, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 689 (2010).
51  BUTLER, supra note 2, at 83–84.
52  On another aspect of the potential involvement of photographs—real or imagined—in 
interrogations, see ARIELLA AZOULAY, CIVIL IMAGINATION: A POLITICAL ONTOLOGY OF 
PHOTOGRAPHY 23 (2010) (Louise Bethlehem trans., 2012) (adding that “[w]hen an interrogator . . .
tells a detainee that he has a photograph showing the detainee in such or such a situation, the 
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known) case exemplifying this phenomenon will be examined shortly.  This case 
concerns four Israeli Border Police soldiers who videotaped their physical abuse of 
Palestinians in the West Bank—abuse that led to the death of one Palestinian and 
the injury of at least three others.53
B. Distal Representational Violence
Distal representational violence differs from proximal representational 
violence in its broader spatio-temporal scope: It begins long before the actual act of 
physical and mental torture, continues long after this act ends, and operates in 
substantial part outside the facility where this act takes place.  Three important 
forms of distal representational violence, whose common objective is to conceal 
physical and mental torture, will now be examined: secrecy, denial, and destruction 
of audio-visual evidence.
Secrecy has come to be a defining feature of state torture.  In modernity, 
torture has generally ceased to be a public spectacle of scarring or branding the 
body of the tortured to proclaim state power and deter others.  Instead, the emphasis 
has shifted toward disciplining or intimidating the prisoner alone while hiding 
torture from the public.54 This distinguishes state torture from some other types of 
state violence, such as state-sponsored political assassinations—now commonly 
termed “targeted killings”—which have transformed in recent years from a largely 
clandestine practice to one conducted more visibly.55 Interrogational torture, in 
particular, owes much of its effectiveness and pervasiveness—in the United 
States,56 Syria,57 Israel,58 and elsewhere—to usually taking place beyond public 
sight,59
interrogator does not necessarily reveal the photograph to the detainee—if it exists at all. . . . [Thus,] the 
mere possibility of the existence of a photograph of us taken without our knowledge might come to 
affect us with as much potency as if we had encountered the photograph itself”).  On U.S. soldiers’ 
recording of their human rights abuses in Afghanistan beyond the torture context, see Graham Bowley 
& Matthew Rosenberg, Video Inflames a Delicate Moment for U.S. in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/asia/video-said-to-show-marines-urinating-on-
taliban-corpses.html; Thom Shanker & Graham Bowley, Images of G.I.’s and Remains Fuel Fears of 
Ebbing Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/world/asia/us-
condemns-photo-of-soldiers-posing-with-body-parts.html.
in “the dark . . . chamber,” as J. M. Coetzee has aptly called the 
53  In 2003, these soldiers were convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping for the 
purpose of battery, and other offenses.  For the separate court decisions concerning these soldiers (due 
to their different roles in the abuse), see CrimC (Jer) 907/05 State of Israel v. Bassem (Sept. 22, 2005), 
available at http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/m05000907.htm; CrimC (Jer) 157/03 State of 
Israel v. Butvika (Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/m03000157-
324.htm; CrimC (Jer) 3172/07 State of Israel v. Lalza (Apr. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/m07003172-297.htm.  For the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
appeals of the State and two of the defendants, see CrimA 10594/05 Bassem v. State of Israel (May 22, 
2006), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/05/940/105/O03/05105940.o03.pdf; CrimA 5136/08 
State of Israel v. Lalza (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/360/051/
r05/08051360.r05.pdf.
54  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 3–31 (Alan Sheridan 
trans., 1995) (1975).
55  Susanne Krasmann, Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship, 25 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 665, 668–70 (2012).
56  Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 13–41 (2008).
57  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 18.
58  HAJJAR, supra note 25, at 67–75, 188–99.
59  Gorelick, supra note 10.
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interrogation room in another context.60 It is for this reason that photos of torture, 
on the rare occasions that they are publicly available, usually depict events that 
occurred outside the interrogation room.  Indeed, the incidents shown in the Abu 
Ghraib pictures did not take place in interrogation rooms, but rather were meant, 
among other things, to “soften up” detainees for interrogation.61 While 
interrogations of suspected terrorists in U.S. custody have occasionally been 
videotaped, those of Palestinians in Israeli custody are generally not videotaped, nor 
apparently are those of anti-government activists in Syria.62
All three countries have sought increased control of detainees by drawing a 
veil of secrecy beyond the interrogation room over detention facilities at large.  In 
2009, President Obama tried to thwart the publication of additional photographs 
and videos of torture at Abu Ghraib.63 A year later, journalists were expelled from 
Guantánamo for publishing the name of a witness testifying on interrogation 
techniques.64 Most prison troops at Guantánamo, who until recently could decide 
for themselves whether to give reporters their names, are now under orders to 
withhold this information.65 Syria, too, limits outside observers’ access to its 
detention centers, thereby hindering efforts to establish how many people have been 
detained since the beginning of the anti-government protests in 2011.66 Moreover, 
in addition to specific details about detention facilities, the very existence of some 
facilities has also been hidden: The CIA has operated clandestine interrogation and 
detention sites at inaccessible U.S. military bases (or “black sites”),67 and until 
2002, Israel concealed the existence of Facility 1391, which was used for 
interrogation and detention purposes.68
Alongside secrecy, another form of representational violence is state denial 
of torture testimonies.  The shift in modernity toward concealing state torture from 
60  J.M. Coetzee, Into the Dark Chamber: The Novelist and South Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 
1986), http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/02/home/coetzee-chamber.html.
61  Johanna Bond, A Decade After Abu Ghraib: Lessons in “Softening Up” the Enemy and Sex-
Based Humiliation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 1, 8–9 (2012).  Another, earlier example is a photograph showing 
a U.S. soldier supervising the waterboarding of a captured North Vietnamese soldier that appeared on 
the front page of the Washington Post in 1968.  The photograph, whose publication eventually led to a 
court-martial, was taken outdoors.  Walter Pincus, Waterboarding Historically Controversial, WASH.
POST (Oct. 5, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/04/AR2006
100402005.html; Eric Weiner, Waterboarding: A Tortured History, NPR (Nov. 3, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/2007/11/03/15886834/waterboarding-a-tortured-history.
62  See supra notes 47–48, infra notes 127–129, and accompanying text.
63  CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 23, at 316–17; Concern at ‘Prisoner Abuse’ Photographs,
supra note 8.
64  Jeremy W. Peters, Pentagon Reinstates Banned Guantánamo Reporter, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
2010), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/pentagon-reinstates-banned-guantanamo-
reporter/.
65  Carol Rosenberg, ‘Transparent’ detention at Guantánamo? Not anymore, MIAMI HERALD (Jan.
4, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/01/04/3852565_transparent-detention-at-guantanamo.
html.
66  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 12.
67  While an executive order Obama issued in 2009 ordered the closure of CIA “detention 
facilities,” this term excluded facilities for “short-term” detention before rendition to other countries.  
The Department of Defense has admitted that it continues to use such facilities.  OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 20; CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 23, at 329.
68  KHALILI, supra note 45, at 128–33.  According to the Israeli authorities, Facility 1391 has not 
been used since 2006, and it was only ever intended for the special cases of detainees from outside 
Israel/Palestine.  Id. at 129–30.
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the public, discussed above,69 also gave rise to the deniability of that torture.70 This 
categorical denial goes beyond the doubts concerning testimony reliability and 
accuracy intrinsic to legal discourses, potentially making the alleged torture 
invisible71 to anyone other than the state72 and sometimes the torture victim.  The 
Israeli authorities, for example, tend to deny accusations of interrogational abuse or 
torture,73 and Palestinians making such accusations have often faced mistrust from 
the Israeli (and to a large degree the U.S.) media and public.74 In addition, 
Palestinians reporting abuse and torture in Israeli custody have occasionally been 
described as unreliable and even immoral by Israeli officials75 and the alleged 
abusers.  During the abovementioned trial of the Israeli Border Police soldier, the 
defendant accused his Palestinian victims of having coordinated their testimonies 
and added: “Arabs tend to exaggerate.  And if they get a chance to knock over [i.e., 
to frame] anybody—they would do so in a big way.”76
Lastly, another noteworthy form of representational violence is the 
destruction of visual evidence of physical and mental torture.  Torturers themselves 
sometimes produce such visual evidence, as in the previously mentioned case of the 
Israeli soldiers who videotaped their abuse of Palestinians in the West Bank.77 But 
in that case, the abusive soldiers eventually decided to destroy the potentially 
incriminating videotape.78 Potentially incriminating visual evidence can also be 
produced when interrogations are videotaped, as they were by the CIA.79 But here 
too, in 2005, CIA officials destroyed (at least) two interrogation 
videotapes.80 According to publicly available documents, the CIA’s initial 
instructions were to retain the videotapes, but by early 2003 it came to regard them 
as a security risk to the officers filmed in them and to the U.S. public in 
general.81
69  Supra note 
Other interrogation videotapes, on which the charges against 
54 and accompanying text.
70  PAUL W. KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 2–3 (2008).
71  SCARRY, supra note 2, at 9, 56.
72  “The state,” however, is never a monolithic entity.  See, e.g., Thomas Blom Hansen & Finn 
Stepputat, Introduction: States of Imagination, in STATES OF IMAGINATION: ETHNOGRAPHIC
EXPLORATIONS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE 1, 14 (Thomas Blom Hansen & Finn Stepputat eds., 
2001); Jeffrey W. Rubin, The State as Subject, 15 POL. POWER & SOC. THEORY 107, 108–11 (2002).
73  There are a few notable exceptions to this tendency, such as the 1987 Landau Commission 
report commissioned by the Israeli government.  For critical discussion of that report, see Symposium 
on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Security 
Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 ISR. L. REV. 141 (1989) (discussing the Landau 
Commission report through multiple contributions to a written academic symposium).  Another 
exceptional example is a 1999 Israeli Supreme Court ruling on interrogational torture, some of whose 
problematic ramifications are mentioned infra notes 109–110, 113, and accompanying text.
74  Allen, supra note 13, at 173.
75  HAJJAR, supra note 25, at 67, 69.
76  CrimC (Jer) 204/99, supra note 46, ¶ 42.
77  See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
78  The defendants also disposed of other potentially incriminating evidence, coordinated their 
stories to avoid suspicion, denied all accusations when a police investigation was opened, and 
threatened a colleague who testified against them in court. CrimC (Jer) 907/05, supra note 53; CrimC 
(Jer) 157/03, supra note 53; CrimC (Jer) 3172/07, supra note 53.
79  See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
80  Denbeaux et al., supra note 47, at 1308–09.
81  Cox, supra note 48, at 131, 134–42; Denbeaux et al., supra note 47, at 1307.
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Guantánamo detainees were based, were said to have “disappeared.”82 Once these 
tapes were destroyed or became unavailable, claims of torture in CIA interrogations 
became virtually impossible to prove—especially given the dominant visual-
evidentiary paradigm that regards verbal torture testimonies as inferior to 
photographic or video evidence.83
C. The Bigger Picture: Domination through (In)visibility
State torture comprises not only a subject’s corporeal encounter with the 
state or its extensions, but also the representational violence whereby the state seeks 
to determine to whom torture will be visible and from whom it should remain 
cloaked.  As shown above, this representational state violence includes, among 
other things, restricting detainees’ view and knowledge of their physical and mental 
torture; keeping interrogation and detention sites invisible and unknown to the 
public; destroying potentially incriminating audio-visual evidence; and denying, 
often categorically, the use of torture.  Such forms of representational violence call 
into question President Bush’s assertion, in his radio address to the American 
people four days after 9/11, that terrorists “believe they are invisible.  Yet they are 
mistaken.  They will be exposed . . . .”84 Visually speaking, counterterrorism, rather 
than fully exposing the nation’s alleged enemies, has in some respects shrouded 
them in a veil of invisibility.  Thus, both non-state terrorism and state torture 
involve representational violence, but in different ways: Whereas non-state 
terrorism is designed primarily to produce traumatizing spectacles,85
These various forms of representational violence are both immediate and 
mediate: They impact those subject to physical and mental torture, and also, in a
far different manner, others—actual or potential witnesses to acts or representations 
of such torture.  This amalgamation of immediate and mediate effects eludes the 
currently dominant conception of torture.  For instance, the U.N. guidelines for 
documentation of torture and its consequences, known as the Istanbul Protocol, 
classify practices such as blindfolding or hooding as torture on account of their 
resulting “[d]eprivation of normal sensory stimulation . . . .”
state torture 
involves the concealment of certain sights and images.  And though some forms of 
representational violence—such as the use of cameras during interrogation or 
torture—are intended to make subjects, sights, and images of state violence hyper-
visible, this hyper-visibility, as explained above, is meant to operate only on the 
state’s terms.
86
82  Lisa Hajjar, An Army of Lawyers, THE NATION (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.thenation.com/
article/army-lawyers.
This conception, 
however, does not encompass all the mental suffering brought about by state 
torture: In addition to sensory deprivation, proximal representational violence of 
83  See supra text accompanying notes 12–16.
84  J. Maggio, The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately after 
9/11, 35 POL. & POL’Y 810, 826 (2007).
85  MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 63–64.
86  U.N. HIGH COMM’R HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ISTANBUL PROTOCOL: MANUAL OF EFFECTIVE 
INVESTIGATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, at 29, ¶ 145(n), U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 
E.04.XIV.3 (1999).
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this sort is also designed to deny detainees—and as a result, the general public—
access to potentially incriminating sights and information.  The detainees’ 
consequent inability to identify their perpetrators or the place of torture can 
aggravate their sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the state, both in real time (while in 
custody) and later on, for example if the state uses it to deny their accusations.  
Proximal representational violence (blindfolding or hooding) thus intertwines with 
distal representational violence (state denial of torture allegations)—demonstrating 
yet again how the impact of proximal violence extends beyond the particular time 
and place of its infliction.  This representational violence to which detainees are 
subjected in turn affects the extent and nature of publicly available information 
(visual and other) on state torture, thus influencing the way physical and mental 
torture is mediated to others subsequent to its occurrence.  While certain sights 
might be horrifying, being prevented from seeing and knowing can therefore be no 
less so for detainees as well as for the general public.87 For the former, the 
“[d]eprivation of normal sensory simulation,” while indeed traumatic, does not fully 
describe this ordeal; for the latter, the absence of certain representations of physical 
and mental torture leaves much to the imagination and therefore invites unnerving 
speculation on the horrors of torture.88
Conversely, distal representational violence (such as the secrecy and denial 
of state torture), while manifesting itself in the way torture is mediated outside the 
time and place of detention, also informs the actual infliction and experience of 
physical and mental torture.  States’ desire to keep torture invisible has, for 
example, led to their increased use of torture methods that leave no lasting visible 
physical marks.89  At the same time, in the case of the United States, the decline of 
such techniques has occurred in tandem with “extraordinary renditions” to other 
countries where interrogational torture is likely to leave physical marks.90 As this 
dynamic exemplifies, not only does the dominant visual-evidentiary paradigm 
inform the creation and reception of torture images, it also—by privileging bodily 
wounds over other forms of evidence91
State torture is thus part of a broader state violence, a violence of 
domination by means of (in)visibility.  Not always entirely coherently,
—affects the actual use of physical and 
mental torture.
92
87  MITCHELL, supra note 
state 
7, at 63 (“Prohibit something from being shown, hide it away from 
view, and its power as a concealed image outstrips anything it could have achieved by being shown.”); 
GILLIAN ROSE, VISUAL METHODOLOGIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERPRETATION OF VISUAL 
MATERIALS 165 (2d ed. 2007) (“[I]nvisibility can have just as powerful effects as visibility.”).
88  Cf. ALLEN FELDMAN, FORMATIONS OF VIOLENCE: THE NARRATIVE OF THE BODY AND 
POLITICAL TERROR IN NORTHERN IRELAND 114 (1991) (discussing the effects of rumours about 
violence in interrogations on the general public, as well as the lasting effects of interrogation on 
suspects).
89  ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION FROM THE COLD WAR 
TO THE WAR ON TERROR 8, 12 (2006); REJALI, supra note 39, at 8–9, 44, 75, 381–82, 408–17.  See 
also, in relation to Israel/Palestine, George E. Bisharat, Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering 
under Israeli Occupation, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 349, 379–80 (1995); James Ron, Varying Methods of 
State Violence, 51 INT’L ORG. 275, 276, 285–86 (1997).
90  Seth F. Kreimer, “Torture Lite,” “Full Bodied” Torture, and the Insulation of Legal 
Conscience, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. 187, 198 (2005); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
91  See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
92  See, e.g., Jon Coaffee, Paul O’Hare & Marian Hawkesworth, The Visibility of (In)security: The 
Aesthetic of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism, 40 SECURITY DIALOGUE 489, 496–98 (2009) 
(characterizing urban defenses against terrorism in the post 9/11 United States and United Kingdom as 
I_VITERBO ARTICLE JUNE 2014 - FINAL VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2014 3:32 PM
2014 Seeing Torture Anew 297
violence of this sort operates, as Laleh Khalili has observed, through “powerful 
state actors compelling subject populations to be visible to their own police and 
security forces, while preventing them from being visible to audiences not chosen 
by the state.”93
Placing state torture within this broader political-representational context is 
crucial for getting to grips with the circumstances under which it occurs.  Take the 
previously mentioned case of the Israeli soldiers who made and later destroyed a 
videotape of their abuse of Palestinians:
Admittedly, the actual effects of this representational violence may 
differ from its intended consequences (depending on myriad factors), but this 
diminishes neither the significance nor the potency of this violence.
94 These events took place in a specific 
location—Hebron—the second largest city in the West Bank (after East Jerusalem), 
which is governed by a particular regime of (in)visibility.  According to an Israeli 
military intelligence officer, the Israeli military has placed about a hundred closed 
circuit cameras in the Hebron city center, making it “the most documented place on 
earth.”95 At the same time, over the years oppression by the Israeli military and 
harassment by Israeli settlers have forced Palestinians out of the city center, 
resulting in the near invisibility of the Palestinian population to visitors to this part 
of the city.96 The (in)visibility of torture thus operates within a broader matrix of 
state-induced (in)visibility.97
The representational economy of torture is nonetheless a contested and 
contestable space, inhabited not only by the state and its extensions but also by 
human rights organizations and others, who increasingly utilize photography and 
videography in an attempt to record, bring to light, and potentially minimize state 
violence.98 International NGO Avaaz, for instance, has trained citizen journalists in 
Syria and provided them with cameras, laptops, and satellite equipment to 
disseminate their materials.99
evincing certain “aesthetic paradoxes”).  On the instability, unpredictability, and entropy of violence in 
general, see BRUCE B. LAWRENCE & AISHA KARIM, General Introduction: Theorizing Violence in the 
Twenty-First Century, in ON VIOLENCE: A READER 1, 1, 7, 14 (2007).
Israeli NGO B’Tselem likewise distributes video 
93  Laleh Khalili, Palestinians: The Politics of Control, Invisibility, and the Spectacle, in
MANIFESTATIONS OF IDENTITY: THE LIVED REALITY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON 125, 
140 (Muhammad Ali Khalidi ed., 2010); see also Elia Zureik, Constructing Palestine Through 
Surveillance Practices, 28 BRIT. J. MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 205 (2001).
94  Supra notes 53, 76–77 and accompanying text.
95  Amir Buhbut, Intelligence Officer: This Is How Hebron Became the IDF’s Nightmare, WALLA 
NEWS (Oct. 5, 2012) (Hebrew), http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/2689/2572849.
96  B’TSELEM & ASS’N FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISR., GHOST TOWN: ISRAEL’S SEPARATION POLICY 
AND FORCED EVICTION OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE CENTER OF HEBRON (May 2007), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200705_hebron_eng.pdf; Joel Beinin, Mixing, Separation, and 
Violence in Urban Spaces and the Rural Frontier in Palestine, 21 ARAB STUD. J. 14 (2013).
97  See also, in relation to the United States, DEREK GREGORY, THE COLONIAL PRESENT:
AFGHANISTAN, PALESTINE, IRAQ 52–53, 67–68 (2004) (counterposing restricting public access to 
images of Afghan casualties of U.S. attacks, on the one hand, to the hyper-visibility of the attacks on 
the World Trade Center, on the other).
98  Allen, supra note 13; Ruthie Ginsburg, Taking Pictures Over Soldiers’ Shoulders: Reporting 
on Human Rights Abuse from the Israeli Occupied Territories, 10 J. HUM. RTS. 17 (2011); Sam 
Gregory, Transnational Storytelling: Human Rights, WITNESS, and Video Advocacy, 108 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 195 (2006); Sam Gregory, Cameras Everywhere: Ubiquitous Video Documentation 
of Human Rights, New Forms of Video Advocacy, and Considerations of Safety, Security, Dignity and 
Consent, 2 J. HUM. RTS. PRACTICE 191 (2010).
99  Syrian Activists & Lawyers Fear At Least 28,000 Forced Disappearances in Syria,
AVAAZ.ORG (Oct. 18, 2012), https://secure.avaaz.org/act/media.php?press_id=377.
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cameras to Palestinians in the occupied territories to enable them to document and 
present to the Israeli and international public violations of their rights.100 “Video 
documentation,” explains B’Tselem, “lends corroboration to Palestinians’ claims of 
rights breached, provides evidence for criminal investigations, and illustrates the 
harsh reality of life under occupation.”101 Cameras in nongovernmental hands can 
thus become weapons in the visual war on state violence, or as an Israeli soldier 
recently put it, “A commander or an officer sees a camera and becomes a diplomat, 
calculating every rubber bullet, every step.  It’s intolerable, we’re left utterly
exposed.  The cameras are our kryptonite.”102
In this light, attempts to think—let alone think critically—about state 
torture and its socio-political context must involve a close examination of the 
representational economy of state torture.  There is, however, another piece to the 
puzzle requiring investigation: the law’s implication in state torture, and the 
relationship between this legal violence and the other types of violence discussed 
thus far—representational, physical, and mental.
II. LEGAL VIOLENCE
Like the representational economy of state torture, its legal economy is a 
site of contestation.  Law lends itself to competing uses and 
interpretationsincluding by states, which seek to use it, as they use various 
mechanisms of (in)visibility, to monopolize violence.103 Thus, along with its 
representational, physical, and mental dimensions, the violence of state torture is 
also partly legal in nature: all too often, states use torture either by actively relying 
on law or by benefiting from law’s indifference. Inasmuch as it facilitates and 
legitimizes torture, legal violence, like the representational violence with which it is 
interrelated, causes physical and psychological pain and suffering—even if it does 
so seemingly less directly than the sort of acts that law itself defines as 
“torture.”104 Also like other types of state violence (representational, physical, and 
mental), legal violence aims at closing the door on certain socio-political 
possibilities—including resistance, practical and theoretical, to contentious state 
practices.105
100  B’Tselem’s Camera Project, B’TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/video/cdp_background (last 
visited May 20, 2014).
101  Israeli Military Must Permit Video Documentation in Occupied Territories and Conduct 
Investigation of Attack on Photographers, B’TSELEM (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20121218_allow_video_documentation.
102  Itamar Fleishman, Soldiers: Our Hands Are Being Tied, YNET NEWS (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4317755,00.html.
103  WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in SELECTED WRITINGS VOL 1, at 1237, 239 
(Marcus Bullock & Michael Jennings eds., Edmund Jephcott trans., 1999) (1920); MAX WEBER,
Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
323, 334 (Hans H. Gerth & Charles Wright Mills eds. and trans., 2009).
104  Cf. Johan Galtung & Tord Höivik, Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on 
Operationalization, 8 J. PEACE RES. 73, 73 (1971) (arguing that structural violence “kills, although 
slowly, and undramatically from the point of view of direct violence”).
105  Cf. Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 789 (1982) (“A 
relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it 
destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities.”).
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A. Law’s Complicity in the Physical and Mental Violence of Torture
The Bush administration went to great lengths to interpret and move the 
law in the direction of permitting coercive interrogation tactics and extraordinary 
renditions to countries with poor human rights records.  Epitomizing this trend are 
the (in)famous “torture memos” drafted by U.S. government lawyers, which, among 
other things, provided legal arguments in support of the administration’s use of 
highly controversial “enhanced interrogation techniques.”106 Two days after his 
inauguration in early 2009, President Obama issued an executive order limiting 
permitted interrogation methods to those listed in the 2006 Army Field Manual; 
however, according to human rights organizations, some of these listed methods 
constitute torture.107 The Israeli occupation too has, since its inception, been shaped 
by lawyers, maintained through legal institutions, and justified by Israel on the 
basis of legal arguments.108 This includes the previously mentioned 1999 ruling of 
the Israeli Supreme Court,109 which, while prohibiting “physical pressure” in 
interrogations, held that interrogators who employ it in “exceptional circumstances” 
might be exempt from criminal responsibility under the “necessity defense.”110 The 
legalism111 of the Israeli occupation has played a major part in making the torture of 
Palestinians possible,112 and indeed hundreds of sworn affidavits collected from 
Palestinian detainees since the Supreme Court’s ruling indicate the persistence of 
interrogational torture and abuse.113
106  On Bush administration lawyers’ support of such controversial interrogation measures, see M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 389 (2006); Clarke, supra note 56; Clarke, supra note 36; Kreimer, supra note 90; David 
Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1452–60 (2005); Jens David 
Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: 
Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic 
Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2 UTAH L. REV. 345 (2007).
107  CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 23, at 326–27; Close Torture Loopholes in the Army 
Field Manual, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/get-involved/action/close-
torture-loopholes-army-field-manual (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
108  HAJJAR, supra note 25; IDITH ZERTAL & AKIVA ELDAR, LORDS OF THE LAND: THE WAR 
OVER ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 1967–2007, at 341, 343–44, 361–71 
(Vivian Eden, trans., 2007); Bisharat, supra note 89, at 349, 352–53, 390; Emma Playfair, Playing on 
Principle? Israel’s Justification for its Administrative Acts in the Occupied West Bank, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 205 (Emma Playfair ed., 
1992); Avram Bornstein, Palestinian Prison Ontologies, 34 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 459, 463–
64 (2010); Eyal Weizman, Legislative Attack, 27 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 11, 13–14 (2010).
109  HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israeli Government 53(4) PD 817 (Sept. 
6, 1999), translation available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/a09/
94051000.a09.pdf.
110  Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The Israeli Legal System’s Failure to 
Prevent Torture in the Occupied Territories, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 82–84 (2001); 
Catherine M. Grosso, International Law in the Domestic Arena: The Case of Torture in Israel, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 305, 327 (2000); Ardi Imseis, “Moderate” Torture on Trial: Critical Reflections on the 
Israeli Supreme Court Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service Interrogation 
Methods, 5 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 71, 80 (2001).
111  Judith Shklar has defined legalism as, among other things, “a social ethos which gives rise to 
the political climate in which judicial and other legal institutions flourish . . . . Legalism is, above all, 
the operative outlook of the legal profession . . . .” JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND 
POLITICAL TRIALS 8 (2d ed. 1986); see also Neil MacCormick, The Ethics of Legalism, 2 RATIO JURIS
184, 184 (1989).
112  Cohen, supra note 110, at 95–104.
113  Bana Shoughry-Badarne, A Decade After the High Court of Justice “Torture” Ruling, What’s 
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In countries such as the United States and Israel, which view their law-
abiding image as a central source for domestic and international legitimacy, law 
may be more likely to be actively involved in torture,114 as compared with 
authoritarian regimes such as Syria’s.  Nonetheless, in Syria too, state torture and 
law are no strangers: In 2012, Syria adopted a broad Counterterrorism Law and set 
up a Counterterrorism Court, which have reportedly been used alongside Syria’s 
longstanding military field courts to detain, torture, and prosecute tens of thousands 
of people for activities such as peaceful demonstrations and distribution of 
humanitarian aid.  According to a Syrian lawyer working before the 
Counterterrorism Court, forced confessions extracted during interrogations under 
pressure or torture are admitted as evidence and often serve as the only evidence 
against the defendant.115
International and domestic legal sources that define torture are among the 
means through which the United States has endeavoured to justify its use of 
coercive interrogations.  Violence is at the heart of every legal definition, 
classification, or interpretation,116 and part of the violence of these particular legal 
sources is that they mark certain practices as non-torture, thereby potentially 
legitimizing them.117 Thus, the Convention Against Torture distinguishes “torture” 
from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”118 and this distinction 
has been used, in official and popular U.S. discourses, to justify certain coercive 
interrogation tactics.119 Another distinction, between “torture” and “coercion,” is 
found in the 2006 U.S. Military Commissions Act.  While it excluded testimonies 
obtained through “torture,” this Act allowed for the use and non-disclosure of 
“coerced” testimonies.120 Among its functions, legalism serves as a state 
mechanism for the denial of torture;121
Changed?, in THREAT: PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS IN ISRAEL 114, 116 (Abeer Baker & Anat 
Matar eds., 2011).
but by relying on legal definitions of torture, 
what states deny is not their use of physical and mental violence, but the claim that 
114  Hajjar, supra note 40, at 22; Oona A. Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International 
Law of Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 199, 207–09 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
115  Lost in Syria’s Black Hole for Doing Their Jobs–Courts, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/lost-in-syrias-black-hole (last visited Oct. 3, 2013); Syria: Counterterrorism Court 
Used to Stifle Dissent, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 25, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/
syria-counterterrorism-court-used-stifle-dissent.
116  Derrida, supra note 41, at 995; Peter Fitzpatrick, Consolation of the Law: Jurisprudence and 
the Constitution of Deliberative Politics, 14 RATIO JURIS 281, 293 (2001).
117  John T. Parry, “Just for Fun”: Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. 
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 253, 258, 267 (2005).
118  CAT, supra note 20, art. 15.  Interestingly, according to the United Nations Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials, the phrase “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” 
“should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or 
mental.”  Thus, like torture, these practices are viewed as confined to physical and mental violence, and 
consequently, the representational and legal violence they also involve is disregarded.  G.A. Res. 
34/169, art. 5, cmt. c, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/169  (Dec. 17, 1979).  Cited in Parry, supra note 21, at 239–
40.
119  Kreimer, supra note 90, at 198–201; Jinee Lokaneeta, A Rose by Another Name: Legal 
Definitions, Sanitized Terms, and Imagery of Torture in 24, 6 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 245, 264–72
(2010); Parry, supra note 117, at 258–60.
120  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, §§ 948(r), 949(a) (current version at 
10 U.S.C. § 948).  For critical analysis, see Alan W. Clarke, De-Cloaking Torture: Boumediene and the 
Military Commissions Act, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 59, 108–11 (2009).
121  COHEN, supra note 12, at 107–08.
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this violence falls under such definitions.  The perils of this “definitional 
violence”122 require treating “legal violence,” “representational violence,” 
“physical/mental torture,” and the like not as coherent concepts, but as tactical
weapons.123
B. Law’s Complicity in the Representational Violence of Torture
This means using these terms only as long as they aid rather than 
hinder a critique of state torture, as long as they help bring to center stage important 
and overlooked dimensions of the relevant issues, and as long as attention is 
directed to their important overlaps and interrelations.
Whereas law’s involvement in legitimating and even engendering physical
and mental torture has been extensively studied, far less attention has been paid to 
the way law facilitates or sustains the representational violence of torture.  Law’s 
contribution to three types of representational violence discussed above—secrecy, 
denial, and evidence destruction—will now be examined, with a focus on the 
following: the prosecution and conviction of individuals who disclosed classified 
information about state torture; the reliance on law to prevent, conceal, or destroy 
audio-visual records of interrogations that might have involved torture; the use of 
secret evidence and the state secrets doctrine to keep state torture out of public 
sight; and law’s complicity in granting impunity to alleged torturers and those 
accused of concealing torture-related information.
The Obama administration has prosecuted more individuals under the 
Espionage Act for unauthorized disclosures to journalists than all previous U.S. 
administrations combined.  Recently, CIA officer John Kiriakou was sentenced to 
thirty months in prison for revealing information to the press about the identities of 
CIA personnel involved in torture.124 Beyond the torture context, disclosers of 
classified information about other types of state violence have also been prosecuted 
and convicted.  In 2013, U.S. Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning (known 
at the time of her arrest as Bradley Manning) was sentenced to thirty-five years’ 
imprisonment for leaking to WikiLeaks classified information, including video 
footage showing a U.S. military helicopter killing two local Reuters employees in 
Iraq.125 In Israel too, in 2011, former soldier Anat Kam was convicted of espionage 
and sentenced to four and a half years in prison, for leaking to an Israeli journalist 
classified military documents that suggested the military had violated a Supreme 
Court ruling by assassinating Palestinians who could have been arrested.126
122  I borrow this phrase from JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A 
BREAK FROM FEMINISM 310 (2006).
123  For a similar argument in another context, see Mariana Valverde, Specters of Foucault in Law 
and Society Scholarship, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 45 (2010).
124  CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 23, at 332.
125  REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, ANNUAL REPORT 2012—UNITED STATES (2012), available 
at http://en.rsf.org/report-united-states,176.html; Lisa Hajjar, Wikileaking the Truth about American 
Unaccountability for Torture, 7 SOCIETIES WITHOUT BORDERS 192, 197–98 (2012); Julie Tate, Judge 
Sentences Bradley Manning to 35 Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-bradley-manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-
11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html.
126  Naama Cohen-Friedman, Anat Kam Sentenced to 4.5 Years in Prison, YNET NEWS (Oct. 30, 
2011), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4141015,00.html.  The following year, the Supreme 
Court shortened Kam’s sentence to three and a half years, and the journalist to whom the documents 
were leaked was sentenced to four months’ community service. Aviel Magnezi, Court Cuts Anat Kam’s 
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The prevention, concealment, and destruction of audio-visual records of 
interrogations are also partly imputable to law.  Though Israeli law generally 
mandates videotaping interrogations of (Israeli) suspects,127 the law Israel applies to 
Palestinians in the occupied territories includes no such provision.128 The Israeli 
Supreme Court recently rejected an appeal requiring Israel’s General Security 
Service to videotape interrogations of suspected “security offenders,”129 whose 
overwhelming majority are Palestinians from the occupied territories.130 Somewhat 
similarly, it was by reliance on (their interpretation of) the law that high-ranking 
CIA officials pushed for the destruction of interrogation videotapes,131 arguing that 
there was no legal obligation to retain them.132 In Syria, law’s contribution to the 
destruction of visual evidence has taken a different form: the recently established 
Counterterrorism Court133 has reportedly been used, among other things, to 
prosecute opposition activists for documenting human rights violations.134
In the United States, another legal obstacle hindering public access to 
information about, and evidence of, state torture is the state secrets doctrine.  This 
common-law evidentiary privilege allows the U.S. government to refuse discovery 
requests on the grounds of protecting state secrets that are deemed vital to national 
security interests.  The Bush and Obama administrations alike have frequently shut 
down civil lawsuits concerning the extraordinary rendition program—including 
previously published details about it—by successfully invoking this doctrine.  Such 
has been the fate of Maher Arar’s lawsuit regarding his previously mentioned135
rendition from the United States and subsequent torture in Syria.136
Prison Sentence, YNET NEWS (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
4326565,00.html.
127  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW (INTERROGATION OF SUSPECTS) (2002), arts. 4, 17, available at
http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_542.htm.
128  On the considerable disparity between the laws Israel applies to Israeli settlers and those it 
applies to Palestinian residents in the occupied territories, see HAJJAR, supra note 25, at 4–5, 58–61, 
80–81; Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 ME. L. REV.
131, 158–61 (2011); Viterbo, supra note 13, at 136–38.  Another example of this legal disparity is that 
unlike their Israeli equivalents, Palestinian children in the occupied territories are not entitled under 
Israeli military law to have an attorney or family member present in their interrogation.  YOUTH LAW 
(ADJUDICATION, PUNISHMENT & MODES OF TREATMENT) (1971, 14th amendment 2008), art. 9h,  
available at http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/305_004.htm (however, as detailed in art. 9g(a), 
this requirement, applicable to Israeli children, does not apply in some exceptional circumstances).
129  HCJ 9416/10 Adalah v. Ministry of Pub. Sec. (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://elyon1.
court.gov.il/files/10/160/094/s07/10094160.s07.pdf.
130  On “security prisoners” in Israeli custody, see Fatmeh El-’Ajou, Lasting Injustice: 
Discrimination against Palestinian Political Prisoners in the Commutation of Sentences and Early 
Release, 103 ADALAH’S NEWSL. (Apr. 2013), at 1, available at http://adalah.org/Public/files/English/
Publications/Articles/lasting-injustice-elajou-2013.pdf.  On the Israeli “security discourse” more 
broadly, see generally BARUCH KIMMERLING, The Code of Security: The Israeli Military-Cultural 
Complex, in THE INVENTION AND DECLINE OF ISRAELINESS: STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE MILITARY 208 
(2001); JULIANA OCHS, SECURITY AND SUSPICION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN ISRAEL
(2011).
131  On the destruction of these tapes, see supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
132  Cox, supra note 48, at 134–35, 137, 139, 141–42.
133  See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
134  Syria: Counterterrorism Court Used to Stifle Dissent, supra note 115.
135  Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
136  ROACH, supra note 35, at 223–24; Benjamin Bernstein, Over Before It Even Began: Mohamed 
v. Jeppesen Dataplan and the Use of the State Secrets Privilege in Extraordinary Rendition Cases, 34 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1410–11 (2011); Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 77, 186–87 (2010); Fisher, supra note 36, at 1436–48; D. A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable 
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Secret evidence is another device in U.S. law that invokes secrecy in the 
name of national security.  The 2006 Military Commissions Act, prior to its 
amendment in 2009, allowed for the use of secret evidence in prosecuting non-
citizen detainees in U.S. military commissions.137 At the Bagram internment 
facility in Afghanistan, where the United States held thousands of detainees before 
handing it over to the Afghan government in 2013,138 a U.S. military board relied on 
secret evidence when determining whether to release detainees, retain them in 
indefinite detention, or prosecute them.  Former detainees released from Bagram 
have reported that they were not provided with an explanation for their detention, 
evidence supporting the initial suspicion against them, or any opportunity to 
challenge their detention.139 And at Guantánamo, where indefinite detention is 
permitted under a 2011 executive order by President Obama, review of continued 
detention can be based on secret evidence that is not disclosed to the detainee.140
Moreover, a military judge recently ordered a closed pre-hearing of a Guantánamo 
detainee—the first session of its kind under President Obama.141
Secret evidence plays a similar role in Israel/Palestine.  The Israeli military 
is legally authorized to extend the “administrative” detention of Palestinians from 
the occupied territories for additional periods of up to six months each, with no 
maximum cumulative detention period.142 Israeli military court review of 
“administrative” detention is held behind closed doors, often based on secret 
evidence not disclosed to the defense, and the judges are exempt from the regular 
rules of evidence.143 Hundreds of appeals against such military court decisions have 
been submitted to the Israeli Supreme Court in the last decade, but none have 
resulted in a release order or in a rejection of the secret evidence.144
Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429, 485–86 (2012).
137  Clarke, supra note 120, at 61.
138  AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT 2012: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 56, 357 (2012), 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/air12-report-english.pdf; Alex Rodriguez, 
U.S. Hands Over Control of Bagram Prison to Afghan Government, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/25/world/la-fg-wn-us-bagram-prison-afghanistan-20130325.
139  HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, UNDUE PROCESS: AN EXAMINATION OF DETENTION AND TRIALS OF 
BAGRAM DETAINEES IN APRIL 2009 1–2, 9, 12, 14–15 (2009), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Undue-Process-Afghanistan-web.pdf.
140  ROACH, supra note 35, at 210; Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching 
Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2011).
141  Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo Judge Orders First Closed Session of Obama War Court,
MIAMI HERALD (June 13, 2013), available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/13/3450019/ 
guantanamo-judge-orders-first.html.
142  Order No. 1651 Concerning Security Provisions (Integrated Version) (Judea & Samaria)
(2009), arts. 284–85, available at http://www.law.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/files/5/685.pdf.  This provision 
is currently applied to West Bank Palestinians, whereas Gazan Palestinians can be detained for 
unlimited periods according to the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law (2002; amended 2008).  
For further discussion, see B’Tselem & Hamoked, Without Trial: Administrative Detention of 
Palestinians by Israel and the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law 51–63 (2009), available at
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publication/200910_without_trial_eng.pdf.
143  Order No. 1651 Concerning Security Provisions, supra note 142, arts. 287–91.  For further 
discussion of the issue of administrative detention, see AMNESTY INT’L, STARVED OF JUSTICE:
PALESTINIANS DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL BY ISRAEL (2012), available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/israel_ai_2012_starved_of_justice.pdf.
144  Shiri Krebs, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Judicial Review of Administrative Detentions in the 
Israeli Supreme Court, 45 VAND. J. TRAN’L L. 639, 672 (2012).
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Law has also been complicit, by commission or omission,145 in granting de 
facto impunity to state agents accused of involvement in torture.  Attempts to use 
the U.S. courts as a mechanism of accountability for extraordinary renditions—
renditions whose aim is to prevent U.S. citizens from being held accountable for 
torture146—have generally failed.147 In a similar fashion, concerns about impunity 
for torture in Syria, though longstanding, have not resulted in any known 
prosecution or investigation of members of the Syrian security services.  Moreover, 
Syrian law prohibits legal action against members of the state services except by an 
order of the director of the relevant state agency, and no such orders are known to 
have ever been issued.148 As for Israel/Palestine, information provided by the Israeli 
Ministry of Justice indicates that Palestinians submitted over 750 complaints of 
abuse or torture by the Israeli Security Agency interrogators to the Israeli State 
Attorney’s Office between 2001 and 2010, but none of these led to a criminal 
investigation.149 Similarly, none of the investigations the Israeli Military Police 
opened in 2012 concerning alleged offenses by soldiers against Palestinians resulted 
in an indictment.150 The Israeli State Attorney also refuses to investigate allegations 
of torture in Facility 1391151 and prevents human rights monitors from visiting it.152
Despite frequent allegations of coercive interrogations, Israeli military courts very 
rarely exclude Palestinians’ confessions, and Palestinians’ attorneys have described 
challenging such confessions as ineffective and even potentially harmful to their 
client’s eventual sentence.153
145  On omissions as acts of violence, see, for example, JOHN HARRIS, VIOLENCE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
146  KHALILI, supra note 45, at 126; CBS/AP, CIA Off the Hook for Past Waterboarding, CBS
NEWS (June 18, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-off-the-hook-for-past-waterboarding/.
147  ROACH, supra note 35, at 166–67, 222; OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 35, at 20.  
In 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the Mohamed v. Jeppesen rendition case, leaving in 
place a 2010 lower court ruling that dismissed a lawsuit brought by five men who claimed they had 
been subjected to torture as part of the extraordinary rendition program.  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 
138, at 358.
148  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “By All Means Necessary”: 
Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria 71 (Dec. 2011), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria1211webwcover_0.pdf.
149  Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr., International Human Rights Day: Press Release (Dec. 9, 
2011) (Hebrew), http://www.stoptorture.org.il/he/node/1778.
150  Yesh Din, Law Enforcement upon IDF Soldiers in the Territories 2 (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.yesh-din.org/userfiles/file/datasheets/Law%20Enforcement%20upon%20-%202012.pdf.  
On the Israeli military’s tendency not to investigate soldiers’ alleged offenses against Palestinians, see 
also B’TSELEM, VOID OF RESPONSIBILITY: ISRAELI MILITARY POLICY NOT TO INVESTIGATE KILLINGS 
OF PALESTINIANS BY SOLDIERS (2010), available at http://www.btselem.org/download
/201009_void_of_responsibility_eng.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROMOTING IMPUNITY: THE 
ISRAELI MILITARY’S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE WRONGDOING (2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0605.pdf. On a culture of impunity among Israeli 
soldiers serving in the West Bank, as expressed in former soldiers’ testimonies, see Matthew Zagor, ‘I
am the Law’! – Perspectives of Legality and Illegality in the Israeli Army, 43 ISR. L. REV. 551, 562–64
(2010).
151  On Facility 1391, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
152  KHALILI, supra note 45, at 129–30.
153  HAJJAR, supra note 25, at 109.  For an exceptional case, in which a military court excluded a 
confession on the grounds that it had been coerced, see B’Tselem, 13 Dec. ‘11: Military Court Partially 
Acquits Palestinian Due to Forced Confession (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.btselem.org/
torture/20111213_hamidah_verdict.  When interviewed, Israeli military judges and prosecutors 
sometimes inferred that torture was not common, often argued that Palestinians’ confessions were 
motivated by wanting to “show off” to the interrogators or to appear heroic in their community, or 
I_VITERBO ARTICLE JUNE 2014 - FINAL VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2014 3:32 PM
2014 Seeing Torture Anew 305
Furthermore, along with alleged torturers, those who conceal information 
of potential relevance to torture have also been granted impunity through legal 
apparatuses and arguments.  Thus, in an opinion issued in 2011, a U.S. federal 
judge refused to hold the CIA in contempt of court for its destruction of 
interrogation videotapes.154 In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that 
it would not press criminal charges against those responsible for destroying these
tapes.155 No judicial inquiry into the existence or destruction of other CIA 
interrogation videotapes has taken place.156
C. Beyond Liberal Legalism
The use of state torture, the concealment of torture and information about 
it, and the impunity granted to those who perpetrate or hide state torture are 
therefore all largely imputable to law.  This account of the legal violence of state 
torture stands in stark contrast to the liberal view of torture.157  From a liberal 
standpoint, law’s “function” is to prohibit torture, and torture is therefore an extra-
legal or illegal phenomenon, a violation of law.158  According to this view, reliance 
on law to justify torture is no more than flawed legal analysis or even a deformation 
of law.  Law’s fundamental antipathy toward torture, liberal critics of state torture 
contend, is embodied by legal sources such as the Convention Against Torture, the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and also, in the U.S. case, certain 
constitutional protections.159 In further support of this position, examples can be 
provided of legal restrictions on practices that qualify as legal and representational
violence: the provisions of the Convention Against Torture that call upon state 
parties to proscribe and penalize torture;160 the U.S. district court orders that 
mandated the preservation of all evidence regarding the torture, abuse, and 
mistreatment of Guantánamo detainees; or the U.S. Supreme Court ruling enabling 
these detainees to pursue habeas corpus actions.161
Some may impugn this view by pointing to a significant gap between law’s 
condemnation of torture and actual state practice162
contended that Palestinians’ torture allegations were designed to prevent those Palestinians from 
appearing as cowardly.  HAJJAR, supra note 
—a gap exemplified by the fact 
that the United States, Israel, and Syria have all ratified the Convention Against 
Torture, albeit with reservations.  This gap, such critics may add, characterizes not 
only the physical and mental violence of state torture, but also its representational 
25, at 109.
154  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 138, at 358.  On the destruction of these tapes, see supra notes 
79–82, 131, and accompanying text.
155  ROACH, supra note 35, at 222; Cox, supra note 48, at 133.
156  Denbeaux et al., supra note 47, at 1308.
157  The term “liberal” is used here in the sense it has had in modern political thought, not in its 
popular U.S. usage indicating leftist politics.
158  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1721–23, 1726–28, 1739, 1741 (2005).
159  Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture 
in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 283–310 (2003).
160  CAT, supra note 20, arts. 2, 4, 6–9.
161  Denbeaux et al., supra note 47, at 1307–08; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 138, at 358.
162  Hathaway, supra note 114, at 201–04.
I_VITERBO ARTICLE JUNE 2014 - FINAL VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2014 3:32 PM
306 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 50:2
violence.  For instance, the CIA interrogation videotapes were destroyed163 despite a 
court ruling requiring the preservation of such materials.164
Yet, a critique of law as merely ineffective in combating torture fails to 
acknowledge a more fundamental issue: law’s inextricable ties with state violence.  
A more radical critique would challenge the legal/extra-legal dichotomy underlying 
both the liberal view of state torture as illegal and the critique of law as 
ineffective.165 When a state invokes, interprets, or capitalizes on law, what it 
usually claims is the authority to use law.  And such recourse to law is violent, 
regardless of whether liberal critics or others denounce it as illegal.  Its violence lies 
in its repercussions (actual or potential) on the use of torture, as well as in its 
evocation of law’s own violence.  As a number of jurists and others have 
observed,166 law is an apparatus of violence: It is maintained through violence and 
every invocation of it carries violent (albeit not always easily discernible) 
ramifications.  Obviously, law is only part of the story, as illustrated by the fact that 
detainees in U.S. custody overseas had been tortured before U.S. government 
lawyers drafted the “torture memos.”167  The important point, however, is that state 
torture has not only coexisted with the rule of law but has often been written into 
law, or has at least had the force of law.168
III. EXERCISING VISION: RE-ENVISAGING VISUAL EVIDENCE OF TORTURE
So far, two issues emerge as requiring reconceptualization: the nature of 
state torture and the representational regime of that torture.  Regarding the former, 
the violence of state torture ought to be understood as representational and legal—
rather than solely physical and mental—in nature; accordingly, legal and 
representational violence must become a key concern for critiques of state torture, 
as the U.S., Israeli/Palestinian, and Syrian cases clearly illustrate.  Regarding the 
latter, the evidentiary capacity of torture images—their potential and limitations—
requires rethinking, given the possibility of such images inadvertently contributing 
to state dismissal of torture allegations.
These two conceptual reforms are complementary and even interdependent 
in at least two senses.  First, the previously discussed pitfalls of the dominant 
visual-evidentiary paradigm are not merely obstructions to representing state 
torture.  Rather, they are an integral part of the representational and legal violence 
that, among other things, engenders denial of, and impunity for torture.  Second, in 
163  On the destruction of these tapes, see supra notes 79–82, 131 and accompanying text.
164  On this ruling, see supra note 161 and accompanying text.
165  For more nuanced accounts of the relation between legality and illegality in the context of 
state violence, see, for example, Fleur Johns, Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception,
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613 (2005); David Kennedy, Lawfare and Warfare, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (James Crawford & Marti Koskenniemi eds., 2012); 
Krasmann, supra note 55; Natsu Taylor Saito, Colonial Presumptions: The War on Terror and the 
Roots of American Exceptionalism, 1 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 67 (2009).
166  BENJAMIN, supra note 103; LAW, VIOLENCE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Austin Sarat 
ed., 2001); LAW’S VIOLENCE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993); Robert M. Cover, 
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); Derrida, supra note 41.
167  JOSHUA E. S. PHILLIPS, NONE OF US WERE LIKE THIS BEFORE: AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND 
TORTURE xv (2010).  On the “torture memos,” see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
168  John T. Parry, Torture Warrants and the Rule of Law, 71 ALB. L. REV. 885, 897–99 (2008).
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order to lay bare the representational and legal violence of state torture, a critical 
aesthetic is needed—alternative ways of looking at, and thinking about, 
representations and evidence of torture.  Such a critical aesthetic in turn relies on 
rethinking the nature of the object of inquiry itself: state torture.  Critically 
engaging with the issue of state torture is therefore a matter of re-envisaging, of 
seeing things anew in both a figurative and literal sense.169
To further develop these intertwined conceptual reforms, this Part turns to 
torture images from the U.S., Israeli-Palestinian, and Syrian cases, which include or 
evoke three in/visible elements: (a) photographic or video records of the alleged 
torture; (b) the representation process through which torture images are produced; 
and (c) the eyes or face of the alleged torture victim.  These elements are in various 
ways not altogether absent but conspicuous in their invisibility.  And these 
elements’ oscillation between visibility and invisibility can invite consideration and 
investigation of the conditions of possibility of state torture.  By looking at, for, and 
beyond the ostensibly invisible, a critical aesthetic will emerge, aimed at making 
visual, legal, and political absences present.
There is, then, an 
interrelation that is both ontological and analytical: ontological, since state torture 
is, by its nature, inseverable from its representational regime; and analytical, in that 
the critical evidentiary potential of torture images both enables and is enabled by a 
reconceptualization of state torture, so that images and conceptual horizons become 
inseparable.
The importance of (in)visibility not only stems from its centrality to state 
torture, as made evident above, but also from its centrality to representation and 
politics more generally.170
The discussion here draws on the interdisciplinary field of visual studies
Three key questions concerning (in)visibility arise in the 
torture context: First, what role does representational and legal violence play in 
governing the (in)visibility of physical and mental torture?  Second, how is the 
visibility of this representational and legal violence itself governed, considering the 
dominant visual-evidentiary paradigm discussed earlier?  And finally, how do these 
two registers of (in)visibility—the (in)visibility governed by, and the (in)visibility 
of the representational and legal violence of state torture—affect and relate to each 
other? It is such issues that an investigation of (in)visible visual elements may help 
bring to the fore and tackle.
171
169  Cf. BIBER, supra note 
from which valuable insights can be gained into the relationship between state 
violence, law, and evidence.  Regrettably, despite the growing legal literature on 
14, at 71 (describing the act of inspecting crime images as involving 
both seeing and imagining); Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes, Introduction, in IMAGINATION,
PHILOSOPHY, AND THE ARTS 1–2, 4 (Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes eds., 2003) (arguing 
that “users of representations are meant to imagine [the . . . ] truths” representations generate, and 
adding that the “contents of imaginings are fictional propositions in the trivial sense that they are to be 
imagined, not in the ordinary sense that they are a species of falsehood”).
170  JACQUES RANCIÈRE, THE POLITICS OF AESTHETICS: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SENSIBLE 13 
(2004) (arguing that politics revolves around the questions of what is visible or sayable and who can 
see and speak); JACQUES RANCIÈRE, THE EMANCIPATED SPECTATOR 93 (Gregory Elliott trans., 2009) 
(arguing that an image is “a complex set of relations between the visible and the invisible”).
171  On visual studies, see generally SARAH CHAPLIN & JOHN A. WALKER, VISUAL CULTURE: AN
INTRODUCTION (1997); NICHOLAS MIRZOEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO VISUAL CULTURE (1999); ROSE,
supra note 87; MARITA STURKEN & LISA CARTWRIGHT, PRACTICES OF LOOKING: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO VISUAL CULTURE (2001); THE PICTORIAL TURN (Neal Curtis ed., 2010); THEORIZING VISUAL 
STUDIES: WRITING THROUGH THE DISCIPLINE (James Elkins et al. eds., 2012); THE VISUAL CULTURE 
READER (Nicholas Mirzoeff ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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issues concerning visuality and law,172 the field of visual studies itself has yet to 
receive the attention it deserves from legal scholars.173 Furthermore, the visual 
materials typically discussed by the existing legal literature on visuality have been 
either court evidence174 or cultural and media depictions of law.175
Before proceeding, three clarifications about visual evidence are in order.  
First, in thinking about “evidence,” I make no distinction between a legal and a 
supposedly non-legal sense of this term, as the two are generally 
inseparable.
Other images, 
such as those analyzed here, have generally been neglected, and consequently, so 
has their potential contribution to thinking about legal issues.
176 Moreover, even if one insists on distinguishing legal evidence from 
social evidence, both remain relevant to this Article, since evidence law draws on 
society’s broader conventions for assessing veracity and credibility.177 Second, as I 
have argued, representing and seeing torture anew requires going beyond the 
obsession with mimetic (“accurate”) depiction.  It requires combining insight and 
imagination to enable visual images to re-present—and, in some respects, present 
for the first time178
172  See, e.g., LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW
(Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999); SHERWIN, supra note 
—the multidimensional violence of state torture in a meaningful 
1; LEGAL STAGINGS: THE 
VISUALIZATION, MEDIALIZATION AND RITUALIZATION OF LAW IN LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, MEDIA,
ART AND ARCHITECTURE (Kjell Å Modéer & Martin Sunnqvist eds., 2012); ALISON YOUNG, JUDGING 
THE IMAGE: ART, VALUE, LAW (2005); Costas Douzinas, The Legality of the Image, 63 MOD. L. REV.
813 (2000); Bernard Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and Reconfiguration of 
American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1994).
173  Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 610–11; Dag Michalsen, Law as Visual Communication, in
LEGAL STAGINGS, supra note 172, at 91, 91; Leslie J. Moran, Visual Justice, 8 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT
431, 431 (2012).
174  See, e.g., BIBER, supra note 14; NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY:
THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT (2009); TAGG, supra note 4;
Mnookin, supra note 1.
175  This body of literature is vast.  See, e.g., DAVID A. BLACK, LAW IN FILM: RESONANCE AND 
REPRESENTATION (1999); MARJORIE COHN & DAVID DOW, CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM:
TELEVISION AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998); IMAGINING LEGALITY: WHERE LAW MEETS 
POPULAR CULTURE (Austin Sarat ed., 2011); ORIT KAMIR, FRAMED: WOMEN IN LAW AND FILM
(2006); LAW AND JUSTICE ON THE SMALL SCREEN (Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey eds., 2012); LAW’S
MOVING IMAGE (Leslie J. Moran et al. eds., 2004); CYNTHIA LUCIA, FRAMING FEMALE LAWYERS:
WOMEN ON TRIAL IN FILM (2005); ALISON YOUNG, THE SCENE OF VIOLENCE: CINEMA, CRIME,
AFFECT (2010); Shulamit Almog & Ely Aharonson, Law as Film: Representing Justice in the Age of 
Moving Images, 3 CANADIAN J. L. & TECHNOLOGY 1 (2004); Lynda Nead, Visual Cultures of the 
Courtroom: Reflections on History, Law and the Image, 3 VISUAL CULTURE IN BRITAIN 119 (2002).
There are also studies of the iconography of law.  See, e.g., JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS,
REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC 
COURTROOMS (2011); MICHAEL STOLLEIS, The Eye of the Law, in THE EYE OF THE LAW: TWO 
ESSAYS ON LEGAL HISTORY 1 (2008); Linda Mulcahy, Imagining Alternative Visions of Justice: An 
Exploration of the Controversy Surrounding Stirling Lee’s Depictions of Justitia in Nineteenth-Century 
Liverpool, 9 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 311 (2013).
176  On the inseparability of the “legal” from the supposedly “non-legal,” see, for example, Nikolas 
Rose & Mariana Valverde, Governed by Law?, 7 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 541, 545–46 (1998); Pierre 
Schlag, The Dedifferentiation Problem, 42 CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 35 (2009).
177  BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (1991); Aviva Orenstein, 
“My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 161, 162 (1997).
178  Cf. Frances Guerin & Roger Hallas, Introduction, in THE IMAGE AND THE WITNESS: TRAUMA,
MEMORY AND VISUAL CULTURE 1, 9 (Frances Gurerin & Roger Hallas eds., 2007) (describing images 
as capable not simply of evoking the violence of an event, but also of re-presenting it—making it 
present again and in some cases making it present for the first time).
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manner.  It is hence not a matter of how people register visual sensory impressions, 
but rather of vision in its conceptual sense.179 The analysis that follows is therefore 
neither about the intentions of those that produced the images in question nor about 
some viewers’ ability or willingness to respond to these images.180 If alternative 
reactions to visual images of state torture are regarded as “counter-intuitive,” the 
question should be raised as to why this is the case and how visual intuition can be 
reinvented.  Among other things, this requires exposing to criticism the broader 
cultural and semiotic field within which visual images function—a field that 
influences whether elements are regarded as visible and what meaning is ascribed to 
their in/visibility.181 Lastly, instead of professing to tease out any supposedly true 
meaning from torture images,182 this Article seeks to reveal the stories such images 
can tell and the conceptual horizons they can provide when they encounter a viewer 
willing to face them with the necessary attentiveness and imagination.  Because 
such attentiveness and imagination depend on a constant reconstruction and 
revision of ways of looking, and because different images operate differently, this 
analysis should be treated not as a prescription but as an example of critically 
interacting with torture images.
179  See also Nicholas Mirzoeff, On Visuality, 5 J. VISUAL CULTURE 53, 67 (2006) (adding that it 
is also this conceptual, rather than sensory, sense with which visuality is concerned).
180  See also ROSE, supra note 87, at 19, 22–23 (noting that most recent visual studies are 
uninterested in the intentionality of image makers, and that not all audiences can or will respond to 
certain ways of seeing invited by images and their display practices).
181  On visual elements as located within a cultural and semiotic system that informs their visibility 
and meaning, see Judith Butler, Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, in
READING RODNEY KING / READING URBAN UPRISING 15 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993); 
BIBER, supra note 14.
182  On why no image has any “true” meaning, see generally JACQUES DERRIDA, THE TRUTH IN 
PAINTING (Geoffrey Bennington & Ian McLeod trans., 1987); Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation,
in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 1 (Stuart Hall ed., 
1997).
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As explained above, among the effects of representational state violence is 
the scarcity of photographs and videos of state torture.  Absent such visual materials 
that could count as corroborating evidence, witnesses to torture have been asked to 
produce alternative images, including drawings such as these:
Figure 1                                             Figure 2
Published by the New York Times three years after the death of Afghan 
detainee Dilawar in U.S. custody, Figure 1, a sketch by former Reserve M.P. 
sergeant Thomas Curtis, depicts Dilawar chained to the ceiling of his cell at the 
U.S. detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan.183 Figure 2 appears in a report on 
Israel’s detention of Palestinian children by the Swedish section of the NGO Save 
the Children.184
Both images depict interrogation tactics known as “Shabeh,” a variation of 
“stress and duress” in which detainees are bound or handcuffed in stress positions 
for protracted periods of time.
Drawn by sixteen-year-old Palestinian Sawsan Abu Turki, this 
sketch is meant to illustrate the body position abuse she claimed to have suffered 
while in Israeli custody.
185
183  Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (May 
20, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html.  For further details, 
see No Torture. No Exceptions, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb./Mar. 2008, at 16, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0801.torture.pdf.
Though these particular sketches point to the use 
of such methods by the United States and Israel, such tactics have reportedly been 
184  See SAVE THE CHILDREN—SWEDEN, ONE DAY IN PRISON—FEELS LIKE A YEAR:
PALESTINIAN CHILDREN TELL THEIR OWN STORIES 18–19 (2003), available at
http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/2443.pdf.  This image appears 
here with the permission of Mia Gröndahl and Save the Children—Sweden.
185  REJALI, supra note 39, at 327.
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in use in Syria as well,186
By virtue of their naiveté, childlike simplicity, and their production by non-
experts, these visual testimonies are far from “realistic” and therefore “fail” to 
deliver what is usually expected from visual evidence: a sense of immediacy, of 
“being there” as a witness to “reality.”  This supposed failure is likely to diminish 
the evidentiary status of such images and prevent them from gaining the 
corroboratory power of “good” photographic evidence.
which is another testament to the transnational nature of 
state torture.
187
And yet, the (seeming) failure of these images is a function, or product, of 
a specific evidentiary-visual regime, a regime that assumes certain relations 
between exhibition and signification.  This regime, some of whose pitfalls I 
examined earlier, is governed by the previously discussed principles of naïve 
realism and mimetic depiction, by a preoccupation, explicit or implicit, with 
distinguishing the representable from the unrepresentable, and by the assumption 
that determinate relations exist, or should exist, between the subject and the means 
of representation.  Under alternative regimes of representation, more possibilities 
may open up for rendering apparent absences present.188 A number of scholars 
across disciplines have pointed to the importance of looking where nothing seems 
to exist and making something out of it.189
In this vein, it is precisely the non-realistic quality of the above images that 
carries its own evidentiary potential.  It constitutes these images as evidence of the 
lack of other means of visual representation—photographs or videos—that would 
more likely be regarded as realistic and therefore as strong corroborating evidence.  
Aside from depicting the interrogational torture in use by the United States and 
Israel, these drawings can therefore serve as a reminder of the representational 
violence through which such countries prevent audio-visual records of their 
interrogations.
I would advance this line of thinking 
even further: What is necessary is not simply rendering certain invisibles visible, 
but rather investigating the oscillation between visibility and invisibility which 
constitutes state torture, on the one hand, and, on the other, provides a valuable 
platform for critically addressing that torture.
In Abu Turki’s case, the departure from realism is particularly pronounced 
in two respects.  First, the report that tells her story notes her age, sixteen years, and 
186  AMNESTY INT’L, SYRIA: TORTURE BY SECURITY FORCES 18–21 (1987), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/MDE24/009/1987/fr/30caf66d-bf6d-4513-b52a-
7cd5c1a017bc/mde240091987en.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 18, 20, 36–41, 43–53, 
56–58, 63, 66–67, 74.
187  On the precedence given to photographs taken by professional photographers over 
photographs of amateurish appearance, see TAGG, supra note 4, at 98.  In addition, images such as 
Sergeant Curtis’ sketch, which depict detainees as faceless or unidentifiable, could reinforce the 
stereotype of terrorist suspects as anonymous, invisible, and faceless.  MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 162, 
165.
188  On different representational regimes, their characteristics, and the possibilities they produce 
for representability, see JACQUES RANCIÈRE, THE FUTURE OF THE IMAGE 136–37 (Gregory Elliott 
trans., 2007); RANCIÈRE 2004, supra note 170, at 21–22.
189  See, e.g., Costas Douzinas, A legal phenomenology of images, in LAW AND ART: JUSTICE,
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS 256 (Oren Ben-Dor ed., 2011) (noting the importance of legal creativity that 
“confronts the nihil, what is not, the nameless or void, and makes something out of it”); Nicholas 
Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 37 CRITICAL INQUIRY 473, 476–78, 485 (2011); see also Fassin, supra
note 14, at 535–36 (arguing that testimony is of value fundamentally by virtue of what is absent from it, 
by bearing witness to what cannot be witnessed).
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classifies her as a child.  This framing of her case seems bound to detract from the 
evidentiary status of her drawing, given the prevalent, but debatable, notion that 
children are relatively unreliable witnesses, unable to distinguish fact from fantasy 
and incapable of accurately recollecting and clearly communicating past 
events.190 Second, in the report quoting her testimony, Abu Turki’s drawing is 
accompanied by another visual image: a photograph showing her holding her 
sketchbook:191
Figure 3
Not only does Abu Turki’s presence in this photograph authenticate her 
drawing, but it also underscores the disparity between her “real” self (represented in 
this photograph as holding up the sketchbook) and the drawn, “unrealistic” 
representation of herself (which appears in the sketchbook).  The juxtaposition of 
these two disparate representations is a reminder that it is in the absence of an 
audio-visual record of Abu Turki’s interrogation that this sketch was retroactively 
and amateurishly drawn.  In this respect, this photograph is a metapicture, an image 
of image-making, a representation of the representation process itself.192
190  MICHAEL KING & CHRISTINE PIPER, HOW THE LAW THINKS ABOUT CHILDREN 66–72 (2d ed. 
1995); Nick Lee, The Challenge of Childhood: Distributions of Childhood’s Ambiguity in Adult 
Institutions, 6 CHILDHOOD 455, 462–65 (1999).
The focus 
of this meta-representational photograph is on the image maker (Abu Turki), the 
image (the sketch), the platform (the sketchbook), and implicitly, the background 
against which the need arose to produce such an image in the first place—namely, 
191  SAVE THE CHILDREN—SWEDEN, supra note 184, at 21.
192  W. J. T. MITCHELL, Metapictures, in PICTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON VERBAL AND VISUAL 
REPRESENTATION 35 (1995).
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representational state violence and the consequent absence of photographs and 
videos.
Re-enactment photographs are similarly meta-representational.  
Photographs showing re-enactment of waterboarding of non-U.S. citizens by the 
CIA are pervading the Internet.193 NGOs have also used re-enactment photographs 
to depict Israel’s treatment of Palestinian detainees.194
To a large extent, then, contrary to the sort of photographs and videos that 
are likely to be regarded as good visual evidence, the evidentiary power of visual 
images such as the above lies not in their providing what appears to be a realistic 
and unmediated record of state torture.  Instead, precisely through their non-realistic 
or mediating character these images gain a particular evidentiary potential: the 
potential of testifying not only to physical and mental torture but also to the way 
that torture is mediated, both by state efforts to control the visibility of torture and 
by the processes of representation in which non-governmental actors are engaged.  
Rather than creating a sense of immediacy, of simply witnessing state torture, the 
evidentiary value of such images has to do with potentially intimating the 
representation at work and creating a tension between looking at and looking 
through an image of torture.
Understanding such images 
as a mere simulation of real events misses their capacity to call to mind the very 
real reason for resorting to re-enactment: representational state violence, including 
the prevention of public and media access to places where state torture takes place.
195
Consider the possible implications for the deadlock in which (verbal) 
torture testimonies commonly find themselves caught when they are considered not 
to be directly corroborated by visual evidence: a cycle of denial by the alleged 
perpetrators, counter-allegations, and counter-denial.  As long as this impasse is 
viewed as stemming from a deficit in convincing evidence, and as long as visual 
persuasion is associated with such qualities as “accuracy” and “transparency,” the 
only relevant visual evidence will remain “realistic” photographs or videos.  But if 
the representational and legal violence of state torture is acknowledged, and if 
evidence of torture is evaluated on grounds additional to its mimetic accuracy, then 
non-realistic images such as the above can help move beyond (instead of just 
193  See, e.g., 2005: CIA Waterboarding, WATERBOARDING.ORG, (Nov. 6, 2007),
http://waterboarding.org/node/17; Toby Harnden, Osama bin Laden Killed: CIA Admits Waterboarding 
Yielded Vital Information, TELEGRAPH (May 4, 2011),  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
al-qaeda/8491509/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-CIA-admits-waterboarding-yielded-vital-information.html.
194  DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT’L—PALESTINE, BEARING THE BRUNT AGAIN: CHILD RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS DURING OPERATION CAST LEAD 53–54, 101, 105 (2009), available at http://www.dci-
palestine.org/sites/default/files/bearingthebruntagain.pdf; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT’L—PALESTINE,
PALESTINIAN CHILD PRISONERS: THE SYSTEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONALISED ILL-TREATMENT AND 
TORTURE OF PALESTINIAN CHILDREN BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES 88 (2009), available at
http://www.dci-pal.org/english/publ/research/CPReport.pdf; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT’L—ISRAEL 
& DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT’L—PALESTINE, ALTERNATIVE REPORT FOR CONSIDERATION 
REGARDING ISRAEL’S INITIAL OPAC PERIODIC REPORT TO THE CHILD’S RIGHTS COMMITTEE 47, 49, 
51 (2009).
195  For a socio-legal discussion of the power of certain media to expose the representation at 
work, see Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 629–38; cf. Leslie J. Moran, Every Picture Speaks a Thousand 
Words: Visualizing Judicial Authority in the Press, in INTERSECTIONS OF LAW AND CULTURE 31, 34 
(Priska Gisler et al. eds., 2012) (arguing that with courtroom sketches, “the marks of the process of 
making the image are visible and are part of the image.  With a photograph, there is rarely anything in 
the image that evidences the process of image-making . . .”).
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struggling to resolve) this deadlock by broadening the conversation about what 
torture is and how it can be represented.
Other images, such as the following, have an additional capacity: to 
uncover the legal violence of state torture:
Figure 4                                                            Figure 5
Figure 4 is one of several drawings that the NGO Human Rights Watch 
commissioned from a Syrian artist for its 2012 report on the detention, ill-treatment, 
and torture of anti-government protesters in Syria.  According to this report, the 
torture tactics depicted in these drawings have been widely used in detention 
centers across Syria, including the practice, which is shown in this particular image, 
of beating bound and blindfolded detainees with objects.196 Figure 5 shows five 
sketches that appear in at least two reports by the Palestine section of NGO Defence 
for Children International,197
196  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
representing, like the two images analyzed above, 
variations of the Shabeh interrogation method.  Again, “non-realistic” sketches 
allude to the absence of photographic or video records of the allegedly abusive 
interrogations.  But these particular images also provide their viewers with 
30, at 20, 22. © [2012] Human Rights Watch.
197  COOK, HANIEH & KAY, supra note 43, at 79; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT’L—PALESTINE,
PALESTINIAN CHILD POLITICAL PRISONERS 3, 4, 7, 13, 43 (2007), available at http://www.dci-
palestine.org/sites/default/files/pcpreport.pdf.
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something else: in both of them the detainees are depicted as blindfolded or hooded.  
Similar images of blindfolded or hooded detainees are abundant in media reports198
and NGO publications.199
Further still, the visible invisibility of detainees’ eyes or faces brings to 
center stage the decisive impact invisibility has on the tortured, the torturer, and the 
viewer, in terms of their experience or conceptualization of state torture.
Though there are obviously other images, in which 
detainees’ faces appear as visible, the focus of images such as these on blindfolding 
or hooding highlights the importance of these forms of proximal representational 
violence.
200 First, 
such images create some affinity between the viewer and the tortured: Both of 
them are forced to be visually impaired, so to speak, by the representational 
violence to which they are, in substantially different ways, subject.  And second, in 
such images, the hood mirrors the hood-as-mask that torturers sometimes wear to 
conceal their identity.201
In addition to shining a spotlight on representational state violence, such 
images of blindfolded detainees also conjure up the image of Lady Justice, who is 
herself commonly portrayed as wearing a blindfold.  Although this image has come 
to symbolize the impartiality of law, it can point, in this context, in at least two 
problematic directions.  First, in early visual representations of Lady Justice as 
blindfolded, her covered eyes were, in fact, negative emblems of law’s inability to 
get things straight.202
198  Harnden, supra note 
In view of the above discussion of legal violence, part of 
engaging critically with images of blindfolded detainees must be to revisit and 
revive this disused yet relevant image of law as incapable of, and in some 
circumstances even insufficiently interested in, preventing the use, concealment, 
and disavowal of torture.  Second, law’s blindfold serves a double function: while 
preventing law from seeing its subjects, it also prevents these subjects from 
knowing where law’s gaze is directed.  Law’s potency thus stems, to a large extent, 
from its ability to simultaneously conceal both state violence and its own 
193.
199  DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT’L—PALESTINE, BEARING THE BRUNT AGAIN, supra note 194, at 
101; PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN LIVES: MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF 
TORTURE BY US PERSONNEL AND ITS IMPACT, at cover page (2008), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/BrokenLaws_14.pdf; PUB. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN 
ISR., BACK TO A ROUTINE OF TORTURE: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PALESTINIAN DETAINEES 
DURING ARREST, DETENTION AND INTERROGATION—SEPTEMBER 2001—APRIL 2003, 25 (2003), 
available at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/back%20to%20routine.pdf; WATERBOARDING.ORG,
supra note 193; Witness Against Torture, Broken—Promises / Laws / Lives (2012), 
http://witnesstorture.org/pdf/tri-fold-leaflet-1-6-2012.pdf; Witness Against Torture, Will You (n.d.), 
http://witnesstorture.org/pdf/Will_You.pdf.
200  This feature—the invisibility of detainees’ eyes or faces—is present in other images used by 
NGOs: B’TSELEM & HAMOKED, ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION: THE TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF 
PALESTINIAN DETAINEES 50, 52, 70, 72, 73, (2007), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200705_utterly_forbidden_eng.pdf; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN 
INT’L—PALESTINE, BEARING THE BRUNT AGAIN, supra note 194, at 54; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN 
INT’L—PALESTINE, PALESTINIAN CHILD PRISONERS, supra note 194, at 88; DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN 
INT’L—ISRAEL & DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT’L—PALESTINE, supra note 194, at 49; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 30, at 21.
201  This latter argument appears in MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 62.  On the tactics state agents use 
to conceal their identity from detainees, see supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
202  ERWIN PANOFSKY, STUDIES IN ICONOLOGY: HUMANISTIC THEMES IN THE ART OF THE 
RENAISSANCE 109–10 (1972); Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind?: The Challenge of Images to the 
Law, in LAW AND THE IMAGE, supra note 172, at 19, 19–21.  For relevant discussions of images of 
Lady Justice, see also RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 175, at 62–105; Mulcahy, supra note 175.
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involvement in that violence.203
Important elements of state torture that all too often remain overlooked due 
to their ostensible invisibility or absence—such as an (absent) photographic or 
video record of an alleged torture incident, or the processes through which a torture 
image was produced, or the law’s culpability for state torture—can thus be rendered 
present or conspicuous in their invisibility.  This, however, does not simply mean 
that supposedly weak visual evidence actually brings torture to light while 
supposedly good visual evidence fails to do so.  Such a conception would be no 
more than a simplistic inversion of the dominant visual-evidentiary regime.  The 
exercise in vision put forward in this Article is more ambitious: It seeks to 
destabilize, rather than merely reverse, the visible/invisible binary.  Critical 
engagement with state torture should not be about proclaiming the invisible to be 
visible (or vice versa) for the purpose of “resolving” or “suspending” entanglements 
of in/visibility.  Instead, oscillations between visibility and invisibility—a key 
factor in the relationship between state torture, representation, and law—should 
themselves be subjected to inquiry.
Hence, the violence of law is no less embodied by 
Lady Justice’s blindfold than by the sword she is often portrayed as holding.  The 
resemblance of images of blindfolded detainees to law’s imagery thus provides an 
opportunity for framing law, for visually foregrounding its violence, for 
incorporating it into the troubling picture/story of detainees’ suffering.
CONCLUSION
Legal and social thinking about state torture is governed by two prevailing 
assumptions.  First, under the dominant visual-evidentiary regime, images that 
“capture” torture incidents as “accurately” and “transparently” as possible are—so 
the assumption goes—the best visual evidence of torture.  Second, in its dominant 
conceptualization, state torture is understood as exclusively physical and mental.  
Both the dominant visual-evidentiary regime and the dominant conceptualization of 
state torture, however, can obscure no less than they reveal about the nature, 
context, and implications of state torture.
The Abu Ghraib pictures, a well-known exception to the scarcity of 
photographic and video evidence of torture, are a testament to some of the pitfalls 
of the dominant visual-evidentiary regime of state torture.  Their public reception 
exemplifies a tendency to visually decontextualize torture—to leave out of the 
picture the social, legal, and political forces that brought about the incidents 
depicted in the image—and consequently, to sustain the widespread impunity of 
high-level state agents.  In addition, the elevated evidentiary status commonly 
ascribed to photographs and video of torture, such as the Abu Ghraib pictures, can 
unwittingly play into the hands of state denial of torture by making it easier for the 
state to dismiss verbal torture testimonies uncorroborated by such privileged visual 
materials.
203  Cf. Costas Douzinas, Prosopon and Antiprosopon: Prolegomena for a Legal Iconology, in
LAW AND THE IMAGE, supra note 172, at 36, 58  (“As in Kafka’s story ‘Before the Law,’ the law is 
always somewhere else, in the next room, deferred and unseen, awesome in its power, a sign of the 
transcendent apprehended in its absence.”); Peter Goodrich, The Iconography of Nothing: Blank Spaces 
and the Representation of Law in Edward VI and the Pope, in LAW AND THE IMAGE, supra note 172, at 
89, 94, 100 (discussing the facelessness and unrepresentability of the source and power of law).
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The dominant conceptualization of state torture has its limitations as well.  
Thinking of the violence of state torture as solely physical and mental in nature 
overlooks two interrelated types of violence that play a decisive role in the 
operation of state torture, in the impact state torture has on those subjected to it, in 
what enables it in the first place, and in the way knowledge about it is shaped and 
mediated.  The first—representational violence—consists, in the present context, of 
state attempts to control the (in)visibility of state torture; the second—legal 
violence—concerns law’s complicity in legitimating, bringing about, and 
concealing state torture.  By taking into account these two pivotal yet hitherto 
neglected forms of violence, this Article has sought to shed new light on state 
torture in three cases: the detention of non-citizens by the United States overseas 
(particularly in Afghanistan, Guantánamo, and Iraq); the detention of Palestinians 
by Israel; and the detention of opposition group members in the ongoing armed 
conflict in Syria.
This Article has examined various manifestations of the representational 
violence of state torture in these three cases, including blindfolding, hooding, using 
cameras during interrogations or torture, concealing information about state torture, 
destroying audio-visual evidence of torture, and denying the very use of torture.  As 
for legal violence, while law’s complicity in physical and mental torture has drawn 
considerable scholarly attention, its involvement in the representational violence of 
state torture remains greatly under-examined.  Addressing this lacuna, this Article 
has investigated manifestations of both these aspects of legal violence, including, 
with regard to the latter (representation-related legal violence): the prosecution and 
conviction of individuals who leaked information about state torture (and state 
violence generally); legislation used to prevent, conceal, or destroy audio-visual 
records of interrogations; reliance on secret evidence in prosecuting dissidents or 
non-citizens who could be exposed to torture; use of the state secrets doctrine, 
which allows non-disclosure of information concerning alleged torture; and the 
contribution of legal institutions, by commission or omission, to the
unaccountability of state agents alleged to have used or concealed torture.
In the currently prevailing approach to visual evidence of state torture, 
representational and legal violence ordinarily remain invisible, as do other 
processes pertaining to state violence and its representation.  But perhaps by 
reinterpreting what representation does and means, torture images, rather than 
merely being limited and burdened by these seemingly invisible forces, can also be 
harnessed to lay bare and challenge them. Using visual materials from the U.S., 
Israeli-Palestinian, and Syrian cases, this Article has provided a rethinking of the 
evidentiary capacity of torture images, with a focus on visual elements that oscillate 
between visibility and invisibility, such as photographic or video evidence of 
torture, the process of producing torture images, and the law’s culpability for 
torture.  Such in/visible elements possess a unique evidentiary potential of exposing 
the problematic representational and legal economy of state torture to criticism 
while challenging conventional notions about legality and (in)visibility.
Thus, this Article aims to encourage conversation about how to think and 
see beyond what might appear visible and imaginable, in an attempt to challenge 
the seeming invisibilities of state torture.  This in turn involves not only broadening 
but, equally importantly, reinventing the field of inquiry, envisaging anew state 
torture, representation, and law.
